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Abstract 
This study investigates the dynamics that shaped the Turkish-Qatari relations 
from 2002 to 2013. First, through a rigorous survey of the literature, it probes the 
Turkish-Gulf Arab relations from late 1970s until 2000s with a view to pinpointing 
prominent dynamics. In light of these general dynamics, the study then zeroes in on the 
regional and domestic motivations that facilitated a political alignment between Ankara 
and Doha. Second, through expert interviews, the current study substantiates the 
findings from the meager literature on the Turkish-Qatari relations.  
Findings of this study indicate that the historical evolution of the Turkish-Gulf 
Arab relations is marked by political orientations of actors, security concerns and 
economic interests. Findings on the regional dynamics of the more specific Turkish-
Qatari relations indicates that close relations between Ankara and Doha cannot be 
viewed separately from the overall trajectory of relations with the other Gulf Arab 
countries, most notably Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE. However, the underlying 
forces that the Arab Spring surfaced seems to have challenged this conclusion, as 
Ankara and Doha currently enjoy exceptional relations with one another while they are in 
increasingly worse terms with their neighbors.  
The study further reveals that the present Turkish-Qatari political alignment is not 
attributable to one specific factor. These relations have been shaped by a confluence of 
numerous dynamics. First example is the convergences of foreign policy approaches 
and tools both actors have used, which facilitated taking similar positions on important 
regional issues. Another finding is that the regional developments prior to and 
throughout the specified period created a conducive environment for both actors to 
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cooperate in numerous areas. In this regard, Arab Spring stands out as the most 
prominent arena whereby Ankara and Doha elevated their relations to the level of 
political alignment. The study also suggest that the domestic dynamics, as materialized 
in the role of leadership, as well as both actors‟ interests, have been important 
determinants of cordial relationships. Finally, identity politics, as materialized in both 
actors‟ vision regarding the regional political structure and who the players of this 
structure should be, stands out as a central force that shaped relations.   
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CHAPTER I: Evolving Dynamics of Turkish Foreign Policy 
Towards the Gulf Arab Countries1 
1.1. Introduction 
 Significant global and regional political developments gave rise to new 
political actors in the Middle East at the beginning of the twenty-first century. 
While the influence of the traditional Arab heavyweights such as Egypt and Saudi 
Arabia seemed to fade away, other regional countries such as Iran on the one 
hand and Turkey and Qatar on the other hand have become increasingly more 
prominent political actors. The emergence of Turkey and Qatar in the regional 
political scene since the beginning of the millennium could be attributed to 
several factors. First, the region was witnessing a power vacuum due to the 
dwindling influence of traditionally leading countries. Second, the US reluctance 
to be involved in regional affairs provided space for the political visibility of these 
political actors. Third, using public diplomacy, mediation and conflict resolution as 
powerful foreign policy tools, both Turkey and Qatar built confidence across the 
region. These important factors, combined with strong economic indicators, 
augmented the regional and international visibility, and in return the soft power of 
Ankara and Doha concurrently.  
 The outbreak of the popular Arab uprisings, or the Arab Spring2, at least 
                                                 
1
 The phrase “Gulf Arab countries” in this study refer to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE, and less so to 
Bahrain and Oman. Turkey’s relations in the Gulf is generally towards  or from these three countries, in 
addition to Qatar. Muscat and Manama  have generally enjoyed minimal relations with Ankara. 
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initially, presented Turkey and Qatar with a conducive political environment to 
cash in their confidence, investments in and cooperation with the Islamists, i.e. 
the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). Against this political context, Turkey and Qatar 
emerged as natural allies in regional politics. At this critical juncture, Saudi Arabia 
and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) emerged as the strongest adversaries of 
this alliance as they saw in the increasing power of the Islamists a threat for their 
survival and the region‟s security and stability. What factors led Turkey and Qatar 
to concur on almost all regional developments and pursue similar political 
objectives? To answer such a complicated question comprehensively, it 
becomes imperative to trace the special relationship between Ankara and Doha 
from its initial stages to present day.     
 Starting with the new foreign policy approach under the leadership of the 
Justice and Development Party (JDP) in Turkey in 2002 (Ayhan, 2011; Cevikalp, 
2013; Gumus, 2013; Guney, 2013; Kocgunduz, 2011) and Sheikh Hamad bin 
Khalifa in Qatar, economic, political and socio-cultural relations between the two 
actors improved dramatically. Later, these relations paved the way for a 
convergence of policies on different regional and global issues (Ozturk, 2011). 
For some, these relations are no more than a product of convergence of foreign 
policies and strategic interests on several issues, and therefore they are purely 
                                                                                                                                                 
2
 The term “Arab Spring” will be used to refer to the “Arab Uprisings” or “Arab Revolts” in this study. 
This choice does not connote any personal preference/tendency of the author. Rather, “Arab Spring” is a 
popular term and most of the scholarly articles and the popular media use it.     
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pragmatic (Dr. B. Baskan3, personal interview, May 19, 2014), while for others, 
relations between Turkey and Qatar, especially after the onset of the Arab 
Spring, is a good example of political alignment4 that is grounded in identity 
politics (Simsek, 2013; S. Marufoglu5, personal interview, May 27, 2014). 
 Some political analysts argue that the ideological aspects of the Turkish 
and Qatari foreign policies became more prominent because they both viewed 
the rising power of Islamists as harbinger of stronger Islamist influence in the 
region (A. Abdulla6, personal interview, May 25, 2014; A. Sager7 personal 
interview, August 27, 2014; K. Koch8, personal interview, August 27, 2014). 
Moreover, both actors calculated that, given the regional power vacuum and the 
rising power of Iran, other Sunni actors would approve of their initiatives 
(Marufoglu, 2014). Policies inspired by such expectations and driven by a strong 
leadership on both sides prompted considerable level of political convergences 
between Turkey and Qatar. As of 2013, compared to the other Gulf Arab 
countries, Turkish-Qatari relations demonstrated an exceptional level of 
harmony. 
 The regional power vacuum since the First Gulf War and the resultant 
                                                 
3
 Dr. Birol Baskan, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, Doha, Qatar.  
4
 Political alignment refers to convergence of political visions and positions of two or more political actors. 
It does not connote a political alliance, which is more intense in degree and scope.   
5
 Dr. Sinan Marufoglu, Qatar University, Doha, Qatar & Celal Bayar University, Manisan, Turkey. 
6
 Dr. Abdulkhaleq Abdulla, Political Science Department, the United Arab Emirates University, Al-Ain, 
UAE.  
7
 Dr. Abdulaziz Sager, Chairman and Founder of Gulf Research Center, Cambridge, UK.   
8
 Dr. Christian Koch, Director of the Gulf Research Center, Geneva, Switzerland.  
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security concerns motivated both Turkey and Qatar to pursue a security oriented 
foreign policy until 2000s. This started to change with the settlement of domestic 
political tensions and propagation of a different foreign policy outlook under the 
auspices of visionary leadership both in Ankara and Doha (Marufoglu, 2014). 
This clear shift in foreign policies of both actors at the turn of the century is one 
main reason why this study starts its investigation of the relations from 2002 
onwards. Another reason why this study starts its analysis from 2002 is Sheikh 
Hamad bin Khalifa‟s visit to Turkey in 2001, whose effects began to be felt more 
prominently from 2002 onwards, with the JDP assuming power in Turkey. The 
study covers the relations until 2013, when the Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Hamad bin 
Khalifa, the main architect of Qatar‟s foreign policy, abdicated power to his son. 
Also, 2013 was an important time as Turkish-Qatari relations witnessed an 
exceptional level of political alignment due to the regional political dynamics the 
Arab Spring instigated. What motivated such cordial relations and the political 
alignment between the two actors? This study is an attempt to probe the 
dynamics behind such close relations and the political alignment within the 
specified period. 
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1.2. Evolving Dynamics of Turkish Foreign Policy Towards the Gulf 
Arab Countries: Historical Background 
 Relations between Turkey and the oil-rich Gulf states were minimal until 
1980s. There were several reasons for this. First of all, political orientation of 
both sides were somewhat antithetical to one another: Turkey was a secular and 
democratic country who pursued a complete Westernization process while the 
Gulf countries, spearheaded by Saudi Arabia, were conservative monarchies that 
were, at least initially, suspicious of Westernization. Second, “benign neglect9”, 
“non-interference” and “maintaining a balance towards Arabs and Israelis” were 
the most important principles of the Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle 
East. Such principles precluded Turkish foreign policymakers from developing 
genuine relations with the region in general and the Gulf states in particular for 
decades (Marufoglu, 2014; M. Zweiri10, personal interview, May 27, 2014).  
 Third, relations with other Arab countries in the Middle East, particularly 
Syria and Iraq, both neighbors of Turkey to the south and the southeast, 
determined Turkey‟s relations with the Gulf to a considerable extent (Altunisik & 
Tur 2005; Criss, 1997). Turkey mostly viewed the region through its problematic 
relations with these two neighboring countries and wanted to stay away from a 
“troubled region”. Likewise, the Gulf Arab countries, viewed Turkey from the 
                                                 
9
 “Benign neglect” in International Affairs refers to non-interference in a political phenomenon or event 
with the expectation that non-interference would benefit a political actor more than continual attention to 
that phenomenon or event would. 
10
 Dr. Mahjoub Zweiri, Department of History, Qatar University, Doha, Qatar. 
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lenses of Syria and Iraq and they mostly bought the arguments of their Arab 
brethren vis-à-vis Turkey (Kirisci, 2001).  
 Another reason why Turkey-Gulf Arab relations were minimal was 
because it was not until the 1970s that the Gulf Arab countries, headed by Saudi 
Arabia, assumed a more central political and economic leadership in the wider 
Middle Eastern Arab region with the oil money pouring into their state coffers 
(Hanieh, 2010). As these newly emerging Gulf countries strengthened their 
regional and global position, the center of the Arab political and economic weight 
shifted from the North Africa and Levant to the Gulf Arab region (Abdulla, 2010). 
This systemic shift in regional politics prompted a modification in Turkish foreign 
policy. Another reason why Turkey‟s relations with the Gulf Arab countries were 
minimal was that the majority of the Gulf Arab countries, namely Bahrain, Qatar, 
Oman and the UAE, did not gain their independence until 1971, when the British 
withdrew from the region. This confined Turkey-Gulf Arab relations to the Saudis 
and Kuwaitis for a long time (Marufoglu, 2014). 
 A deeper understanding of the evolution of Turkish-Qatari relations in the 
last decade comes with a prerequisite: a thorough analysis of the motivations 
behind the evolution of Turkish-Gulf Arab relations from late 1970s to 2000s. 
Such an analysis will not only contextualize the Turkish-Qatari relations within the 
larger Gulf context, but it will also facilitate tracing political, economic, strategic 
and socio-cultural motivations. In addition, as there is a lack of literature on the 
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Turkish-Qatari relations, a general analysis of Turkey-Gulf Arab relations can 
shed much-needed light on the dynamics that shaped the evolution of the 
Turkish-Qatari relations from 2002 until 2013. Given these justifications, this 
section focuses on prominent issues, dynamics and motivations of the Turkey-
Gulf Arab relations in the literature.  
 Turkey-Gulf Arab relations have not attracted sufficient interest from 
scholars until the turn of this century. None of the following works allocated any 
specific attention to the Turkey-Gulf Arab relations, except en passant in the 
context of the Gulf War: William Hale‟s (2013) Turkish Foreign Policy Since 1774, 
Altunis & Tur‟s (2005) Turkey: Challenges of Continuity and Change, Ozcan‟s 
(2008) Harmonizing Foreign Policy: Turkey, the EU and the Middle East, Robins‟ 
Suits and uniforms: Turkish foreign policy since the Cold War (2003) and Turkey 
and the Middle East (2003), Bal‟s (2004) Turkish Foreign Policy in Post-Cold War 
Era, Martin & Kerides‟ (2004) edited book The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy. 
The only work that has “a few pages” specifically dedicated to the Turkey-Gulf 
Arab relations is titled “Turkish Foreign Policy: From Independence War to 
Present; Phenomena, Documents and Interpretations” edited by Oran (2001). An 
examination of the “almost-nonexistent” literature that deals, directly or indirectly, 
with the Turkey-Gulf Arab relations points to several major motivations that were 
influential in the evolution of this relationship. 
 First of all, political orientation of both sides was an important 
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consideration in establishing diplomatic and political relations. Although Turkey 
was viewed as a Western country at times, it was viewed as a Muslim country at 
other times. In this sense, religious and historical ties and socio-cultural affinities 
between the two actors facilitated establishing and improving relations. Second, 
the general trajectory of Turkey‟s relations with the neighboring Arab countries 
has been an important determinant for the trajectory of Turkish-Gulf Arab 
relations. For example, relations with neighboring Syria and Iraq, and relations 
with Egypt, the biggest and the most influential of all Arab countries until recently, 
have influenced Turkey‟s relations with the Gulf Arab countries. Third, the 
intensity of Turkish-Israeli relations have dramatically affected the Turkish-Gulf 
Arab relations. When relations with Israel warmed, relations with the neighboring 
Arab countries as well as the Gulf Arab countries seemed to grow tense, and 
vice versa. 
 Fourth, public and elite perceptions of both actors vis-à-vis one another 
were other factors that would accurately predict the success of a rapprochement 
or the failure of an initiative to improve relations. Fifth, Turkey‟s economic 
interests would mostly predict the trajectory of the Turkey-Gulf relations. For 
example, at times when Turkey urgently needed to address its economic woes, 
as in 1980s and 2000s, relations grew much faster. Finally, in cases where the 
regional security arrangements are threatened, Turkey and the Gulf states 
tended to enjoy converging political views, as was evident in the 1979 Iranian 
Islamic Revolution, the Invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the War on Iraq in 2003. 
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These determinants can be examined under four major subtitles, which the 
following section does.   
1.2.1 Foreign Policy Orientations 
 There is a clear parallelism between the trajectory of Turkey-Gulf Arab 
relations and the foreign policy orientations of both sides. Turkey‟s foreign policy 
towards the Middle Eastern Arab countries was based on the concept of benign 
neglect, from the announcement of the Republic of Turkey until well into the 
1960s. The policy of benign neglect, which was in operation until the Cyprus 
Crisis in 1964, and the policy of non-intervention in intra-Arab affairs, which was 
in force until the Invasion of Kuwait in 1990, determined the quality and quantity 
of relations with the Gulf (Ozel, 1995; Yavuz, 1997; Altunisik & Tur, 2005; Hale, 
2013). Turkish foreign policymakers calculated that interference in Arab affairs 
would harm Ankara‟s interests, whereas avoiding such affairs would bring 
benefits. Within this framework, Ankara tried to avoid complicated relations with 
the Arab world. Until long after Kuwait enters the list of independent Gulf 
countries in 1961, Turkey-Gulf Arab relations were confined to the relations with 
Saudi Arabia per se.  
 Gulf countries, more specifically Saudi Arabia, became the new champion 
of Islamic solidarity and Arabism after the defeat of Nasser‟s Egypt in late 1960s. 
Saudi Arabia viewed Turkey‟s position on Arab issues, such as the UN voting on 
Algerian independence and recognition of Israel in 1949, as destructive to the 
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unity of the Arab world and Islamic solidarity, which are the most important pillars 
of the Saudi foreign policy to this day. Such adverse Turkish foreign policy 
decisions, according to Samaan (2013), fed the perception of terrible Turk in the 
Arab world, creating mistrust and suspicion on both sides.  
 The meager literature on Turkey-Gulf relations fails to mention whether or 
not Turkey and Saudi Arabia had any motivation to cooperate in face of growing 
Communist threat in the Middle East and how Saudi foreign policymakers viewed 
Turkey‟s secular, democratic and Western-oriented state establishment vis-à-vis 
their own theocratic monarchy. This scarcity of literature begs even more 
attention as both Saudi Arabia and Turkey were staunchly pro-American and 
anti-Communist at the same time. Moreover, this paltry literature fails to address 
whether Saudi Arabia or Turkey attempted to balance their foreign policy 
orientations with a view to forming a stronger front against the Communist threat. 
1.2.2. Relations with Israel 
 Another important dynamic that was pivotal in the evolution of Turkey-Gulf 
Arab relations was Ankara‟s pro-Israeli stance and diplomatic relations with 
Israel. Yesilbursa, (2010) observes that Turkey had a relative interest in the Gulf 
in the 1950s, mostly in Saudi Arabia, after the Democrat Party assumed power. 
Similarly, Saudi Arabia expected the Democrat Party, which purported to be an 
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antithetical party to the stanchly secular Republican People‟s Party11 (RPP), to 
have a different approach to Turkey‟s co-religionists. However, the Democrat 
Party‟s excessive reliance on the USA and its increasingly more Western stance 
on international issues caused the Middle Eastern Arab countries and Saudi 
Arabia to view to Turkey as “a stooge of Western imperialism” (Yesilbursa, 2010; 
Gonlubol & Kurkcuoglu, 2006). For example, Turkish Foreign Minister Zorlu 
visited Riyadh in 1957 in order to ask for support for the Baghdad Pact, which for 
many was a British initiative under the mask of Turkey (Uzer & Uzer, 2005). 
Although King Saud seemed to appreciate Turkey‟s concern that the Soviet 
infiltration into Syria would bring new threats for the whole region, he reiterated 
that Turkey‟s pro-Israeli position and her diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv 
prevented establishing closer relations and cooperation between Saudi Arabia 
and Turkey (Yesilbursa, 2010).  
 The course of Turkish-Israeli relations assumed even more attention after 
King Faisal, a staunch supporter of Arab causes, and Islamic unity and solidarity, 
assumed power in 1964. King Faisal‟s term coincided with Turkey‟s realization 
that the policy of supporting Israel unconditionally, which was in order to gain US 
security promises vis-à-vis the potential Soviet aggression, was not serving 
Turkish interests as the Cyprus Crisis in 1964 showed (Ozel, 1995; Bengio & 
Özcan, 2000).  
                                                 
11
 RPP, founded by Kemal Ataturk, remained in power from 1923 until 1950 as the single party. In 
Turkey’s first genuine multi-party elections in 1950, the RPP’s adversary, the Democrat Party, won a 
landslide victory. RPP’s allegedly anti-Islamic policies and staunchly secularist outlook was to be taken 
advantage of by right-wing and Islamist parties.   
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 The first high-level visit from the Gulf Arab countries to Turkey was in this 
period. The Saudi King Faisal paid a short visit to Turkey in 1966 as part of his 
official tour for advocating the establishment of the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference (OIC), which was founded in response to the Israeli victory in 1967 
Arab-Israeli War (Erhan, 2010). Kamel (1974) maintains that closer relations with 
Saudi Arabia, and later with Kuwait, influenced Ankara‟s foreign policy priorities 
in favor of Arab and Muslim causes. For example, Turkey became a vocal 
supporter of the Arabs in international forums; strove to keep minimal relations 
with Israel in order not to disappoint its Arab counterparts; and embraced a 
multidimensional foreign policy outlook in order to improve its political, economic, 
commercial and socio-cultural relations with the Arab countries.  
 Increasing economic and political connections between Turkey and the 
Gulf constituted an important factor in shaping Turkey‟s foreign policy towards 
Israel in this period. For example, at the OIC‟s Lahore Summit in 1974, Turkey 
was pressured to severe its diplomatic relations with Israel. Otherwise, the 
funding from the Islamic Development Bank would not be granted to Ankara 
(Yavuz & Khan, 1992). Mounting economic concerns in Turkey motivated Ankara 
to grant permission to the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) to open an 
office in Ankara in 1976 and support anti-Israeli decisions at the OIC. When 
Israel unilaterally announced Jerusalem as its “complete and united capital” in 
1980, Saudi Arabia‟s pressure and release of a $250 million financial aid were 
instrumental in Ankara‟s decision to downgrade its diplomatic relations with Israel 
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(Koni, 2012) 
 Similarly, Yavuz & Khan (1992) maintain that Gulf Arab countries 
threatened Turkey with halting financial assistance and political support unless 
Ankara totally severed ties with Israel. Turkey played a balancing game between 
such Arab demands and its relations with the West, which was not independent 
of its relations with Israel. This continued until after the Camp David Accords in 
1978, which significantly reduced such Arab pressure. Like in the 1970s and 
1980s, economic and political engagements with the Gulf countries affected 
Turkey‟s Israeli stance in the post-Cold War political context of the1990s. 
However, unlike the 1970s and 1980s, when Turkish foreign policy priority was 
expanding economic opportunities with the Gulf countries, Turkish foreign policy 
in 1990s prioritized national security vis-à-vis the Kurdish separatist activities. 
These national security concerns and the easing of the Arab-Israeli tensions 
paved the way for military cooperation agreement between Turkey and Israel in 
1996 (Ozcan, 2008; (Bengio & Özcan, 2000). This agreement infuriated the 
Muslim world in general and the Arabs in particular, passing two harsh 
resolutions against Turkey in OIC‟s 8th summit in Tehran in 1997, forcing 
President Demirel to leave the summit in protest (Raptopoulos, 2004). In fact, 
security-concerns poisoned Turkey‟s relations with the Arab world in general and 
the Gulf in particular throughout the 1990s.  
 The pendulum of Turkish-Israeli relations would swing once more during 
JDP‟s second term in office. The Israeli War on Lebanon in 2006, the Israeli 
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attack on Gaza in 2009, Prime Minister (PM) Erdogan‟s criticism of the Israeli 
President Peres and Israel at the Davos Summit in January 2009, and finally the 
2010 Israeli massacre of nine of the Turkish citizens on Mavi Marmara Flotilla12 
motivated a nosedive in Turkish-Israeli relations, while it created a conducive 
political environment for Turkey to mend its relations with the rest of the Middle 
East (B. Koroglu13, personal interview, May 26, 2014).  
1.2.3. Economic Concerns 
 Economic concerns have grown increasingly more important over the 
years for Turkish-Gulf Arab relations. With petrodollars pouring in the 1970s, the 
market potential and the financial aid and investment capabilities of the Gulf Arab 
countries increased dramatically. Regional political developments weakened 
Arab nationalism and the center of Arab politics gradually shifted to the Gulf 
(Abdulla, 2014). At this conjunction in history, political elite in Ankara was facing 
a dire need for cheap oil and more foreign investments to continue the economic 
growth, given the American embargo on Turkey due to Ankara‟s intervention in 
Cyprus in 1974 (Yavuz & Khan, 1992). In addition, the growing Gulf markets 
were becoming lucrative destinations for Turkish exports.  
 Starting with the 1970s, literature on Turkey-Middle East Arab relations 
                                                 
12
 Mavi Marmara is the Turkish flotilla that set out for Gaza for providing humanitarian assistance to the 
Palestinian people. The flotilla organizers expected to attract international attention to the sufferings of 
Gazans under Israeli blockade. However, Israeli naval forces attacked the flotilla in international waters 
before reaching to Gaza and killed 9 Turkish citizens, which later increased to 10.   
13
 Prof. Dr. Burhan Koroglu, Director of the Civilization Studies Center, Bahcesehir University, Istanbul, 
Turkey. 
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began to emphasize the Turkey-Gulf relations, more specifically the economic 
dimension in relations. In this respect, Al-Sab‟awi (1991), Ayhan (2009), 
Yesilbursa (2009), Yavuz & Khan (1992), Mercan (2008), Cetinoglu (2009), 
Demir (2009), Laciner (2009), Ayhan (2011), Oktav (2013) among others have all 
argued that the prime driver of Turkey-Gulf relations in this period was economic. 
Turkish economy was experiencing serious difficulties and Ankara wanted to tap 
into the potential of Gulf countries to assist Ankara in overcoming these 
challenges. Growing volume of export figures and tourist numbers (Karpat, 
2001); expanding Turkish-Gulf Arab economic interaction, such as the increasing 
number of Turkish companies and Turkish immigrant workers in Saudi Arabia; as 
well as growing Saudi financial aid and investments in Turkey, such as Faisal 
Finance and Al-Baraka Turk (Koni, 2012), were all significant milestones in the 
evolution of Turkey-Gulf economic relations. In addition, most of the bilateral 
agreements with the Gulf countries in this period were geared toward improving 
economic, financial and commercial relations. Although literature mainly focuses 
on Turkey‟s dire need for improving economic relations with the Gulf countries 
and the benefits of this interaction for Turkey, none of the sources seem to 
mention whether or not or to what degree this relationship carried any economic 
or political benefit for the Gulf countries.   
 The agreements in economic, financial and commercial areas, combined 
with Turkey‟s favorable approach to the Arab causes, paid off. Towards the end 
of 1980s, investments in different sectors by the Islamic Development Bank, the 
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Abu Dhabi Fund, the Saudi Fund and the Kuwaiti Fund reached about $1 billion 
(Soysal, 2000). Increasing economic relations were also reflected in the trade 
shares. While Turkey‟s export to European Economic Community comprised 
64% of its total exports in 1979, this figure dropped to 49% in 1981; in contrast, 
exports to the Middle Eastern countries increased from 23% in 1979 to 44% in 
1981 (Demir, 2009). 
 Literature also mentions how economic relations between Turkey and the 
Gulf countries attracted a refreshed attention in 1980‟s with the cordial diplomatic 
exchanges between the military regime in Ankara (1980-1983) and the Gulf 
leaders. According to Firat and Kurkcuoglu (2001b), the Gulf countries, led by 
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, were favorable to the military regime in Ankara and this 
facilitated Turkey‟s growing economic relations with the Gulf. In this respect, 
Kuwaiti Emir Sheikh Jabir Ahmed Al-Sabah visited Ankara in 1981, and 
President Kenan Evren paid a visit to Kuwait in 1982, both for the first time. This 
was followed by President Evren‟s historic visit to Saudi Arabia in 1984. The two 
sides agreed on establishing a Turkish-Saudi Joint Investment and Trading 
Company by private sector actors as well as easing trade regulations. 
Additionally, the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey and 
its Saudi counterpart made major progress regarding expanding trade volumes, 
establishing investment financing companies and inviting Turkish construction 
sector to the Gulf market (Turkiye-Suudi Arabistan Iliskileri (Turkey Saudi Arabia 
Relations), 2008). The literature mentions these exchanges en passant and does 
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not examine why Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were willing to work with the military 
regime in Ankara and how this was perceived in secular circles in the Turkish 
army.   
 Such cordial relations were continued by PM Ozal (1983-1989), who laid 
special emphasis on economic relations with the Gulf in his active, multi-
dimensional foreign policy approach (Laciner, 2009). One of the first legislations 
the Ozal government passed in the parliament was allowing foreigners to buy 
property in Turkey, which was aimed at attracting rich oil Sheiks from Saudi 
Arabia and Kuwait to invest in property in Turkey (Koni, 2012). This was followed 
by a government decree that allowed private financing companies to operate in 
Turkey. Shortly after, Saudi-owned Faisal Financing Institution and Al-Baraka 
Turk Private Financing opened their Turkey branches, followed by Kuwait-Turk 
Islamic Banking in 1989 (Koni, 2012). The literature also lightly touches on how 
the increasing Gulf investments in Turkey influenced the cultural, financial and 
religious institutions and perceptions of Turkish people toward the Gulf Arab 
countries and their understanding of Islam; however it falls short of explaining 
whether or not such perceptions helped enhance economic or political relations 
between the actors.    
 Improving relations with the Gulf were evident in soaring Turkish exports 
to the Arab countries. Although the researcher could not locate specific trade 
volumes between the Gulf countries and Turkey in this period, existing numbers 
point to a drastic increase. While Turkey‟s export to the Middle East Arab region 
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was only $54 million in 1970, this reached $3 billion in 1985, which equaled to 
40.8% of total Turkish exports (Hale, 1988, p.166). In addition, between 1974-
1990, Turkish companies won about $18.3 billion worth of contracts from the 
Middle Eastern Arab countries: with 22 Turkish contracting companies in 1978, 
113 in 1981 and 242 in 1982 along with 250.000 Turkish emigrant workers 
(Robins, 1991, p.101).  
 President Ozal saw the Invasion of Kuwait by Saddam as an opportunity 
to expand Turkey‟s economic influence and win economic and political support 
from the Gulf (Yavuz & Khan, 1992). The Gulf Sheikhdoms responded positively 
to Ankara‟s requests and promised to compensate Turkey for its economic loss 
due to opening up its Incirlik Base to International Coalition‟s military flights and 
complying strictly with the embargo on Iraq. Gulf countries partly realized their 
promises and Saudi Arabia granted $1 billion worth of oil to Turkey and $1.5 
billion worth of oil to the Turkish Defense Fund (Firat & Kurkcuoglu, 2001b). 
However, the changing security landscape in the region would leave some of 
Turkey‟s initial objectives incomplete: expanding economic interests in the Gulf 
and reaping political support from Gulf monarchies. Overall, the Gulf War I did 
not only hurt the Turkish economy but also prepared the ground for a power 
vacuum in the Kurdish region in Northern Iraq which precipitated separatist 
Kurdish terrorism in Turkey‟s Iraqi borders (Altunisik & Tur, 2005; Laciner, 2009).   
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1.2.4. Security Concerns  
 Security concerns were another prominent motivation in how Turkey-Gulf 
Arab relations evolved. The Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979 was an alarming 
development not only for the religiously conservative Gulf monarchies but also 
for secular, democratic Turkey. The Iranian Revolution and the looming threat of 
“regime export” meant the collapse of the American security arrangements in the 
region. The Soviets capitalized on the American failure to evade the revolution in 
Iran and invaded Afghanistan shortly after the revolution. Alarmed with these 
developments, both Gulf Arab countries and the USA sought to formulate policies 
that would maintain oil security and continue the political status-quo in the Gulf 
monarchies (Mercan, 2008). Initially, although some Western powers 
encouraged Turkey to participate in the provision of security to the Gulf in early 
70s when Britain was leaving the Gulf, Ankara refused to be involved (Mercan, 
2008). However, given its increasing economic and political engagement with the 
Gulf countries and the tacit American approval of the Turkish involvement in the 
region‟s security, Ankara was motivated to add “security” as a new dimension to 
its relations with the Gulf in the coming years (Mercan, 2008; Firat & Kurkcuoglu, 
2001a; Ciftci & Ertugay, 2011; Oktav, 2003).  
 In this sense, the Iran-Iraq War that broke out shortly after the Iranian 
Revolution, and which threatened not only Turkey‟s oil security but also the 
survival of the Gulf states, demonstrated that both actors had legitimate security 
and stability concerns in the region (Aykan, 1994; Mercan, 2008). This concern 
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was materialized in agreements Ankara and Riyadh singed in 1984, whereby 
both sides decided to exchange personnel for military training, education and 
cooperation as well as assist each other in establishing and modernizing military 
facilities (Firat & Kurkcuoglu, 2001b). For example, Ankara dispatched a military 
commission to Khamis Mushait airbase in order to train Saudi pilots to protect oil 
fields in the Eastern Province while Saudi officers came to Turkey for training. 
Similar agreements and exchanges took place between Turkey and Kuwait as 
well, but at a limited level.  
 Security concerns were also prominent in how Ankara approached the 
Invasion of Kuwait. Viewing Saddam‟s aggression on a neighboring country 
unacceptable, Turkey had to abandon its traditional policy of non-interference 
and impartiality towards intra-Arab issues (Robins, 2003). Both Turkey and the 
Gulf monarchies stated that the invasion would trigger political instability in the 
region. Turkey‟s willingness to side with the coalition forces was aimed at 
reinforcing not only Turkey‟s strategic importance for the region (Altunisik, 2013; 
Firat & Kurkcuoglu, 2001b) but also for becoming an active member of the post-
war security arrangements.  
 To accomplish the previously stated goal, Turkey strove to convince the 
Gulf countries, mainly Saudi Arabia and the UAE, to purchase Turkish F-16 
fighter jets and armored vehicles. These efforts did not come to fruition as Kuwait 
and the UAE, and later Saudi Arabia announced that they were not interested in 
the deal (Firat & Kurkcuoglu, 2001b). Overshadowed by militarily much stronger 
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actors in the region such as the USA, Turkey was not viewed as a strong 
alternative to the Western military protection. Overall, Ankara‟s security concerns 
about the region played an important role in Turkey‟s siding with the Coalition 
Forces. However, although the war ended with the liberation of Kuwait and the 
security of the Gulf countries was enhanced, its political repercussions would 
comprise serious national security challenges for Turkey in the next decade 
(Altunisik & Tur, 2005; Karadeli, 2007). These challenges would render Turkey‟s 
opening to the region short-lived , pushing Turkey to direct its energy to domestic 
security problems and democratization efforts, rather than expanding its 
engagement with the Gulf states (Oktav, 2011).   
 In 1990s, given its economic exigencies, Turkey sought ways to improve 
relations with Iraq without breaking UN sanctions. Turkey even seemed willing to 
establish a pact, whereby Turkey, Iran and Iraq could control the will for an 
independent Kurdish state in the region (Ozel, 1995). Ozal‟s “peace pipeline” 
proposal that would carry the waters of Turkish rivers to the Arab world was 
designed to abate the Arab suspicions about Turkish intentions towards the 
region and expedite wider regional and economic integration. However, Turkey 
could not be a major partner in the aftermath of the Gulf War I as two major 
problems with Syria continued: the conflict over the waters of Tigris River and the 
support for separatist Kurdish terrorism in Turkey (Altunisik, 2013). Using its 
position in the Arab League, Syria was able to take the water crisis into a pan-
Arab level and was able to push for a Arab League resolution in 1996 which 
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called on Turkey to share its water with Syria and Iraq.  
 Acting together, Syria and Iraq, also supported by Saudi Arabia, launched 
a campaign to stop World Bank funding of development projects on the 
Euphrates and Tigris Rivers (Eder & Carkoglu, 2001). Later, when Turkey started 
incursions into Northern Iraq in an effort to obliterate PKK bases there, Arab 
countries, headed by Syria and Iraq, accused Turkey of trying to divide an Arab 
country (Ozel, 1995). Turkey‟s Kurdish issue was regionalized after an 
independent Kurdish authority was established in Northern Iraq, which became a 
safe-haven for PKK attacks inside Turkey. The First Gulf War created a power 
vacuum in Northern Iraq, where two Kurdish factions actively sought for an 
independent state with the shield the American forces provided. The area under 
the Kurdish control became a springboard for the PKK, who was responsible for 
launching hit and run attacks on Turkish military (Ozcan, 2008). Although Turkey 
and the central government in Iraq regarded an independent Kurdish state as a 
threat to their territorial integrity, the Iraqi government continued to view Turkish 
incursions into Northern Iraq, i.e. the autonomous Kurdish area as foreign 
intervention. Moreover, Syria developed closer relations with Armenia, Greece 
and Iran, which Turkey interpreted as encirclement by hostile countries.  
 To this background, Turkey‟s engagement with the Middle East in the 
1990s was mostly marred by the Syrian support for PKK. Turkey‟s response to 
such developments was drawing closer to Israel. Capitalizing on its connections 
in the Arab world, Syria was able to present Turkish-Israeli relations as a new 
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threat to the Arab world. According to Bengio & Ozcan (2000), for example, 
Syrian Vice-President Khaddam stated that the Israeli-Turkish alignment was 
“the greatest threat facing the Arabs since 1948”. An OIC resolution passed in 
Tehran in 1997 with the efforts of Syria, Iran and Egypt, Turkey was castigated 
for its close relations with the Jewish state (Altunisik, 2013). 
 All in all, foreign policy orientations, relations with Israel, economic 
calculations and security concerns played an important role in shaping the 
Turkish-Gulf Arab relations, which would enter into a new phase at the turn of the 
century. The Invasion of Iraq by the American forces in 2003 and the removal of 
Saddam from power instigated groundbreaking political developments in the 
region, which brought Turkey and the Gulf Arab countries closer yet once again. 
What were the dynamics that brought about closer relations between Turkey and 
the Gulf Arab countries? How these dynamics intersected to shape the relations 
between the two sides? The following section tries to answer these questions.   
1.3. Dynamics of the Increasing Relations between Turkey and the 
Gulf Cooperation Council Countries: 2002 to 2013  
 Although political relations between Turkey and the Gulf Arab countries 
started in the 1980s in real sense, the most conducive domestic and international 
environment came at the turn of the century when both Turkey and the Gulf 
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Cooperation Council (GCC14) countries found an optimal economic and political 
context for improving relations in the political, economic and strategic domains 
(Aras, 2005;  Olson, 2008; Baskan, 2011b; Almuedo, 2011; Talbot, 2013). Many 
scholars argue that the real dynamic behind the drastic improvement in relations 
between the two regional actors is grounded in a combination of structural 
systemic changes and domestic factors (Ari, 2010, Kosebalaban, 2011; Barkey, 
2011). Another instrumental dynamic in the process was increased Turkish 
foreign policy activism and involvement in the region (Talbot, 2013; Oktav, 2013; 
Akkaya, 2013). This fresh foreign policy outlook, as formulated by Foreign 
Minister Davutoglu, embraces a multidimensional foreign policy, zero problems 
with neighbors and it downgrades security concerns while promoting economic 
integration and soft power capabilities (Davutoglu, 2010).    
 In answering what dynamics drive the increased Turkey-GCC relationship, 
Aras (2005) identifies several important factors: the ongoing Iraqi crisis, Turkey‟s 
European Union (EU) membership process, the threat of international terrorism, 
Turkey‟s active participation in the Greater Middle East Initiative headed by the 
US, increasing business and trade relations between Turkey and the GCC, 
Turkey‟s increased profile in the OIC and finally, Turkey‟s response to the issues 
concerning the wider Muslim world. Foley (2010) attributes the rapid 
development of Turkey-GCC relations to the convergence of opinion of both 
                                                 
14
 The Gulf Cooperation Council (founded in 1981) was not an actor in Turkey’s relations with the Gulf 
until mid-1980s. Heretofore, the Gulf monarchies were referred to as the Gulf Arab countries in the thesis. 
From now on, the terms “GCC” and “Gulf Arab countries” will be used interchangeably. 
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actors‟ on four major issues, namely Turkish Parliament‟s refusal to allow the US 
Army to use Turkish territory to invade Iraq in 2003; Ankara‟s foreign policy of 
encouraging rapid economic development and resolving regional political 
problems; the regional instability following the U.S. invasion of Iraq; and finally, 
the realization that old allies, the EU for Turkey; the US for the GCC, may not be 
as valuable as before.  
 For Barkey (2011), several dynamics instigated dramatic improvement in 
the Turkey-GCC relations throughout the JDP governments: the structural 
change in Turkish economy, which became aggressively export-driven from 
1980s onwards and which motivated Turkish foreign policy makers to search for 
new markets; the JDP leadership and their ambition to transform Turkey into a 
global actor; the declining influence of the military which allowed the JDP 
governments to relegate security concerns stemming from the Kurdish 
separatism and Islamist movements in Turkey. Martin (2009) contends that the 
most important dynamics that prompted closer relations between Turkey and the 
GCC states are all security related: increasing Iranian influence in Iraqi politics, 
Iran‟s increasing military power, radical Islamism, potential problems with 
excessive reliance on US security provision and ambivalent GCC relationship 
with Iran. Martin (2009) further contends that Turkey‟s security concerns about 
Iranian nuclear program and radical Islamist overlaps with the GCC‟s security 
concerns and GCC alignment with Turkey would be a win-win opportunity for 
both actors. However, Martin fails to provide a convincing argument as to in what 
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ways the Iranian nuclear program could pose security threats to Turkey, while the 
Turkish government under Erdogan has been supportive of the Iranian 
arguments.   
 Olson (2008) argues that the invasion of Iraq and its ramifications for the 
ethno-political tensions in the Gulf motivated the GCC states to view Turkey as a 
counter-balance to increasing Iranian influence and assertiveness in the region 
as well as the Iraq‟s eventual reconfiguration. These security concerns played an 
important part in North Atlantic Treaty Organization‟s (NATO) Istanbul 
Cooperation Initiative (ICI) offer in 2004 (Ayhan, 2009; Legrenzi, 2007). The ICI 
envisioned to expand its security umbrella over the GCC countries and 
institutionalize its intention to bring the GCC under the fold of the NATO 
(Scheffer, 2005). Although Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE responded 
positively to NATO‟s offer by 2006 and showed willingness to modernize their 
security systems accordingly, the ICI seems to have fallen short of going beyond 
the representational level and could not alleviate GCC‟s mounting security 
concerns (Legrenzi, 2007). Ayhan (2009) maintains that Turkey‟s strong 
economy, NATO membership, Sunni-majority population and moderate policies 
are important considerations for the GCC states to view Turkey as a strategic 
partner. 
 Similar to the trajectory of relations between Turkey and the larger Middle 
East, economic motivations, especially for the Turkish side, were other prime 
drivers of the increasing Turkey-GCC relations. Both initially and throughout this 
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period, economic and political legs of the relationship nurtured one another. 
According to Kardas (2012) Karagol, (2013), Erkacar & Karagol, (2011) and 
Ataman & Ucgan (2011), once Turkey-GCC diplomatic relations were in 
progress, there was an increase in Gulf capital flows into the Turkish economy, 
which was under serious strain due to the global economic crisis. The more high-
level visits from state dignitaries took place, the more the economic interactions 
increased, especially towards Turkey, who offered lucrative opportunities with its 
increasingly stronger economic and financial indicators. These visits were 
especially important for Turkish businesses because it is mostly hard to 
penetrate into the GCC markets without direct governmental assistance. Pointing 
to the importance of high-level visits, Martin (2009), Biresselioglu (2011), Hursoy 
(2013), Guney (2013), Widen (2012) and Ekmekci & Yildirim (2013) state that 
these visits were instrumental for creating a favorable political environment 
necessary for expanding trade and investment as well as cordial political 
relations.  
 In addition, Biberovic (2008), Hursoy (2013) and Biresselioglu (2011) point 
to several dynamics that strengthened economic relations between Turkey and 
the Gulf. On the Turkish side, although Turkey is increasingly becoming an 
energy transit route, it is poor in terms of energy resources and this makes it an 
important customer for Gulf oil and gas. Second, Turkish economy has become 
stronger with substantial macro-level structural reforms, which promotes it into an 
important destination for Gulf foreign direct investments (FDI). Third, successive 
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JDP victories and Turkey‟s rediscovery of the Middle East gave impetus to its 
political and economic stability. In addition, poor investment returns in Western 
markets and high growth rates in Turkish and Gulf Arab markets are cited as 
important dynamics that increased appetite for mutual Turkish-Gulf Arab 
investments, according to Oxford Business Group‟s 2012 Turkey Report. On the 
Gulf side, budget surpluses, Turkey‟s geo-economic position (geo-strategic 
location and huge population), gradual institutionalization of Turkey-GCC 
relations through bilateral agreements (Nasser, 2008) and Turkey‟s EU 
accession talks, which bolstered investor confidence, are other dynamics that 
motivated Gulf businesses to invest in Turkey (Biberovic, 2008).   
 The GCC states‟ concern about radical Islamist movements and Shia 
political activism (Ayhan, 2009) as well as international terrorism (2003 bombings 
in Istanbul and 2004 Khobar Attacks in Saudi Arabia) motivated Turkey and the 
GCC to sign several military cooperation agreements on regional security and 
counterterrorism following the ICI in 2004 (Cetinoglu, 2014). Turkey-GCC 
relations took a more strategic dimension when the council announced Ankara as 
a strategic partner in 2008, first time the GCC extended such status to another 
country. Ayhan (2009), argues that although officials from both sides emphasized 
that this partnership does not target any other country, GCC‟s prime motivation 
was counter-balancing Iran. Ayhan concludes that given the Gulf security 
dynamics, the US plans to withdraw its military presence from the Gulf, potential 
US-Iran rapprochement and Turkey‟s increasing capabilities, Turkey could play a 
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significant role in providing security for the GCC. However, the literature fails to 
account for how the current rift among the GCC countries themselves and the 
disagreements between Turkey and some of the GCC members would impact 
such a conclusion. 
 Similarly, Martin (2009) contends that Turkey‟s conventional military 
capabilities could enhance GCC security as Turkish military power is the only 
regional option that can counter-balance Iran‟s military capabilities. However, 
Baskan (2011) points to the fact that Turkey is not self-sufficient militarily and 
cannot enhance Gulf security. He goes on to argue that Turkey‟s military role 
cannot go beyond being a conduit between the GCC and the NATO, as was 
expressed in the ICI in 2004. In answering whether or not Turkey and the GCC 
can cooperate on the Iranian nuclear issue, radical Islamism and regional 
instability, Martin (2009) argues that Turkey and GCC will proceed cautiously in 
realizing their strategic relationship because, on the one hand, Turkey needs 
Iranian energy for its growing economy and cooperation in fighting against the 
PKK terrorism, while on the other, some GCC members are wary of alienating 
Iran.  
 Another security dynamic that encouraged closer Turkey-GCC relations 
was the Iranian nuclear issue (Ayhan, 2009; Pope, 2010; Taspinar, 2008; 
Cetinoglu, 2014). For GCC countries, a successful Iranian nuclear program that 
would grant Iran the nuclear capability would destabilize the Gulf monarchies 
because Iran would be more emboldened to interfere with the Shia minorities in 
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Bahrain, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. In this sense, Pope (2010) and Ayhan (2009) 
maintain that given Turkey‟s NATO membership and domestic dynamics, the 
GCC states expected Turkey to oppose Iran‟s nuclear program. Along these 
lines, Turkey announced that it is against Iran‟s acquisition of nuclear weapons 
capabilities, while at the same time expressing Ankara‟s support for Tehran‟s 
right to have peaceful nuclear energy. Although, both actors had similar position 
on Iranian nuclear issue initially and this seemed to bring relations even much 
closer, Turkey‟s persistence, along with Brazil, to break the international isolation 
of Iran in 2010 and to find a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear crisis 
caused some confusion and concern at the GCC level (Elik, 2014).  
 As the Arab Spring unfolded, the trust and convergence of opinion 
between Turkey and some of the GCC members, most notably Saudi Arabia and 
the UAE, on regional issues began to vanish. Oktav (2013) argues that the Arab 
Spring disrupted Ankara‟s economy-based relations with the GCC states and 
prioritized the security dimension in relations. Once it was clear that the Islamists 
were the winning side in the fast-unfolding Arab Spring, and how this was 
perceived by the GCC members, especially the Saudi and Emirati governments, 
the relations between Turkey and the GCC began to deteriorate. Turkey, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia and the UAE have all emerged as assertive players that wanted to 
shape the Arab Spring dynamics to their benefit. This caused serious fractions 
not only among the GCC members states, but also between Turkey and the 
GCC. The political differences over the Arab Spring began to overshadow the 
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close Turkey-GCC relations in the economic and strategic realms. The only 
exception was Qatar. Turkey and Qatar witnessed an unprecedented level of 
convergence of opinion and action in numerous regional issues.    
1.4. Problem Statement  
 Albeit extremely limited, the literature on Turkey-GCC relations mentions 
the dynamics of growing Turkey-Gulf Arab relations from 1980s until 2000s. 
There is a much richer literature on the dynamics of Turkey-GCC relations from 
2000s onwards, parallel to the growing political, economic, strategic and socio-
cultural relations. Studies that cover this last period points to several domestic, 
regional and international dynamics that played an important part in the evolution 
of the Turkey-GCC relations. However, there is still an obvious lack of focused 
literature on the dynamics that shaped the more specific Turkey-Qatar relations 
from 2002 to 2013. No study to date has thoroughly studied the evolution of 
Turkish-Qatari relations and charted out the dynamics that were influential 
therein. The meager literature on Turkish-Qatari relations is descriptive, disparate 
and scattered mostly in non-academic sources such as newspapers, magazine 
articles and government and/or private web-sites. The current study addresses 
this gap by providing a focused examination of the dynamics that shaped the 
evolution of Turkish-Qatari relations from 2002 until 2013 and presents its 
findings within a narrative.   
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1.5. Research Question 
1. What regional and domestic dynamics shaped the evolution of the Turkish-
Qatari relations from 2002 to 2013? 
1.6. Methodology 
 This research study utilizes two data collection techniques. The first 
technique consists of a survey of the literature on Turkish-Qatari relations from 
2002 until 2013. The literature survey is conducted by examining a multitude of 
primary and secondary sources such as books, refereed journal articles, online 
newspaper and magazine articles, think-tank reports, documents/notes posted 
on Turkish and Qatari governmental websites and documents published by 
research centers. The survey of literature as a technique aims to scan as much 
data on a topic as possible from a wide range of sources and it stands out as an 
important method. Given the scarcity of sources on the topic, there was no 
selection criteria. Sources were primarily in English and Turkish, and to a smaller 
extent in Arabic.  
 The second research technique used in this study is interview. Sometimes 
primary and secondary sources may fail to document recently trending topics, 
especially when there is a paucity of substantial secondary data on the topic. In 
such cases, expert/elite interviews may be beneficial to substantiate findings 
from a wide range of sources, most of which are non-refereed. In addition, such 
interviews help complete any potential gaps between what is mentioned in the 
43 
 
literature and what novel information interviewees might provide. Hence, 
interviews function as a verification mechanism for the secondary information 
sources. This study draws data from 20 semi-structured interviews15 conducted 
with academics, diplomats, political analysts and think-tank specialists based in 
Turkey, Qatar, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Switzerland, Iran, England and the USA. 
The interviews, which were carried out either in person or online, took place 
either in the interviewees‟ offices/homes or at hotels during conferences. The 
online interviews were done either through several e-mail correspondences or 
Skype calls or in person. All interviews were done solo and there was no one 
else nearby during the interviews. The interviews were conducted in English and 
Turkish. The interviews that took place in Turkish were later translated into 
English prior to the data analysis. The interviewees were selected on two criteria. 
Interviewees with expert knowledge on the topic and easier access were given 
priority. 
 The interviewees were given the consent form, which includes all the 
specifics of the study, and they were briefed about the interview procedures. The 
interviews lasted from 25 to 45 minutes and questions were adjusted according 
to the interviewee‟s expertise areas and backgrounds. None of the interviews 
were recorded as interviewees preferred note-taking. Interview sessions followed 
a standard protocol in order to minimize confounding factors. Semi-structured 
                                                 
15
 Please refer to the list of questions used in the interviews in App. A. These questions provided a 
structure; but when necessary, they were rephrased, skipped or additional questions were posed to explore 
more detailed answers.  
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questions allowed insightful explanations on the dynamics behind the evolution of 
the Turkey-Qatar relations. The most conspicuous difficulty of this technique was 
being able to get appointments for high-raking interviewees, such as diplomats 
whose answers would be invaluable. Another difficulty was getting some 
interviewees talk about sensitive issues, such as the potential Qatar-MB links 
and the recent rift between Saudi-Emirati-Kuwaiti and Qatari governments and 
the recent problems between Turkey and Saudi-Emirati block.  
 The qualitative investigation methods are notorious for ending up with 
voluminous data that may seem unmanageable (Marshall & Rossman, 2006). 
Analyzing qualitative data requires an intense process of sorting, reorganizing 
and restructuring huge amount of information (Patton, 2002). According to 
Marshall and Rossman (2006), qualitative analysis involves a “search for general 
statements about the relationships among categories of data; it builds grounded 
theory” (p.111). Along similar lines, Schatzman and Straus (1973) state that 
“probably the most fundamental operation in the analysis of qualitative data is 
that of discovering significant classes of the things, persons and events and the 
properties which characterize them” (p.110).  
1.6.1. Data Analysis  
 Within the theoretical information on analyzing qualitative data, this study 
employed a five-stage qualitative data analysis process. First, non-usable and 
non-intelligible data was reduced with due consideration to not losing valuable 
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information. Second, salient categories i.e., common themes that most 
interviewees mentioned, were identified wherein the data could be categorized. 
Third, for effective data entry and coding, the NVivo Software, an intelligent 
qualitative analysis software for classifying and arranging large chunks of 
qualitative information, was used to categorize and reorganize the data. Fourth, 
once the categorization was complete, categories were tested against those 
created by examining the literature survey. This stage focused on domestic and 
external dynamics, in addition to noting any alternative explanations on the 
growing Turkish-Qatari relations. Interviewees did not talk about any dynamics 
not mentioned in the existing literature, so there was a considerable overlap 
between the literature and the interview data. Fifth, the analyzed qualitative data 
were inserted into thesis, either as quotations or as interpretations of what the 
interviewees expressed. 
 The next chapter examines the dynamics of relations between Turkey-
Qatar from 2002 until 2013. In so doing, it first provides major milestones in 
Turkish-Qatari relations and then delineates the foreign policy approaches and 
the most prominent foreign policy tools utilized by both actors, with to view to 
singling out convergences in Turkish and Qatari foreign policies and how these 
convergences facilitated taking similar positions on some of the most important 
regional issues.  
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CHAPTER II: Dynamics of Turkey-Qatar Relations: Foreign 
Policy Approaches, Tools and Convergences  
2.1. Turkey-Qatar Relations from 1970s to 2000s  
 Diplomatic relations between Turkey and Qatar were established at the 
ambassadorial level in 1972, which was followed by the opening of the Turkish 
embassy in Doha in 1980 (Widen, 2012). There was a temporary upward trend in 
relations with the opening of the embassy, which brought about an agreement in 
1985 to “strengthen the friendly ties existing between the two countries” and 
“promoting and developing relations in the fields of culture, arts, science and 
technology” (App. B). Within this framework, both countries showed their 
willingness to “develop and facilitate the cultural and intellectual exchange” by 
means of publications, films, radio/television programs and by exchange of 
professionals from different fields (App. B). However, these agreements were not 
ratified until the 1990s, and therefore were not effective in consolidating relations 
between the two parties.  
 When Turkey began to show more interest in the GCC countries due to 
their increasing international political and economic standing, Qatar was included 
in a presidential visit that took place in 1986. During the Ozal governments in the 
1980s, Turkey‟s newly developing political, economic and cultural relations with 
the GCC were mostly towards or from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait due to their 
economic power and larger populations. Another milestone in relations was 
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reached when Qatar opened its embassy in Ankara in 1992. However, due to 
Turkey‟s internal problems and Qatar‟s lack of interest in Turkey, relations 
continued to remain minimal. Although more and more Turkish immigrants and 
business people were choosing Qatar as their destinations, diplomatic relations 
did not demonstrate sufficient improvement due to Turkey‟s securitized foreign 
policy towards the Middle East, and the GCC by extension, and Qatar‟s passive 
foreign policy (Koroglu, 2014).     
 The inactivity in diplomatic and economic relations between Turkey and 
Qatar were to change with Sheikh Hamad‟s assumption of power in 1995. In line 
with his new foreign policy approach of improving relations with all regional 
powers, Turkey and Qatar signed an agreement in 1999 to establish bilateral 
consultations among senior officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from both 
countries. Turkish and Qatari governments emphasized their “desire to increase 
and further consolidate existing ties” and “develop friendship and cooperation” in 
areas of common interest in order to “contribute to international peace, security 
and economic development by means of creating mutual confidence, 
understanding and cooperation in international relations.” (App. C)  
 The framework put forth in the bilateral consultations among senior 
officials gained practical meaning when relations began to rise with Sheikh 
Hamad‟s visit to Turkey in 2001. During this visit, both countries agreed to 
materialize economic and military cooperation by signing several important 
agreements for preventing double taxation, promoting and protecting reciprocal 
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investments, and for cooperating in the military field. In addition to cooperation in 
the field of security, Sheikh Hamad‟s 2001 visit effectuated other agreements, 
such as fighting against organized crime and cooperation in fighting against 
international terrorism, which spoke to the importance both parties attached to 
the regional security and stability (see App. D). 
 While Turkey‟s standing was increasing in the Middle East, security 
concerns in the Gulf were mounting. Political instability in Iraq and Iran‟s 
increasing political influence and its contentious nuclear program, motivated 
Turkey and Qatar to sign another milestone agreement for cooperation in the 
military field in 2007. In addition to affirming the security cooperation agreement 
of 2001, this new agreement envisioned cooperation in military training and 
education, cooperation between Land Forces, Naval Forces and Air Forces, 
exchanging military monitors for training purposes as well as cooperation in the 
field of defense industry, military history, military archives, military publications 
and military museums (see App. E).  
2.2. Foreign Policy Approaches and Tools: 2002-2013  
 A comprehensive understanding of the Turkish-Qatari political alignment 
and exceptionally good relations requires an examination of both actors‟ foreign 
policy approaches and the tools they utilized as well as an examination of why 
and how their policies on numerous regional foreign policy issues converged. 
This examination will shed light on why the evolution of the Turkish-Qatari 
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relations demonstrated an exceptional pattern, compared with other GCC 
countries, especially throughout the Arab Spring. The concurrence of Sheikh 
Hamad bin Khalifa‟s and Qatari Foreign Minister‟s foreign policy visions on the 
one hand and the Turkish Premier Erdogan‟s and Turkish Foreign Minister‟s 
foreign policy visions on the other helped intensify Turkish-Qatari relations in all 
fields within the specified period. When the region began to witness the winds of 
change with the Arab Spring, both parties enjoyed a similar vision of the regional 
dynamics of change and the direction this change should take. This convergence 
of opinions and accompanying policies took Turkish-Qatari relations to a higher 
level, which can be referred to as a political alignment. 
 Foreign policy approach is a strong indicator of how a country envisions to 
realize its national interests. Foreign policy approach of a country determines the 
tools to be utilized to safeguard its position in the international arena and achieve 
its national interests. In order to understand what dynamics facilitated close 
relations between Turkey and Qatar and how these relations eventually 
transformed into a political alignment, we, first of all, need a closer examination 
of their foreign policy approaches and instruments16. Turkish and Qatar foreign 
policy approaches and the predominant tools utilized within the specified period 
concurred significantly. This presented valuable venues for both actors to 
cooperate in regional issues and facilitated forging closer relations. 
                                                 
16
 A foreign policy approach is a general way of understanding how foreign policy should be formulated. A 
foreign policy tool refers to a more specific instrument that is utilized to achieve goals formulated within a 
more general approach. For example, a security-oriented foreign policy approach may utilize military 
instruments, while a diplomacy-oriented approach may use instruments such as foreign aid or public 
diplomacy.    
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2.2.1. Turkish Foreign Policy Approach and Tools: 2005-2011 
 In his Strategic Depth, Ahmet Davutoglu, the intellectual architect behind 
Turkey‟s new foreign policy, refers to two important power parameters, namely 
“stable” and “potential” power parameters. These parameters determine the 
extent of a country‟s power in the international political arena (Davutoglu, 2010). 
While stable parameters comprise of unchangeable factors such as history, 
geography, population and culture; potential power parameters are changeable 
variables such as economic, technological and military capabilities. By examining 
the interaction among these parameters, Davutoglu suggests that Turkey would 
maximize its influence within the regional and international political system by 
pursuing a dynamic foreign policy (Davutoglu, 2010).  
 He further maintains that with a strategic mindset, strategic planning and 
political will, a country‟s power projection can be enhanced. To this end, 
Davutoglu identifies two main goals in the new Turkish foreign policy: a dynamic 
re-interpretation of the power parameters and a multi-dimensional foreign policy 
that emphasizes peace and stability, both domestic and regional. For Davutoglu, 
Turkey‟s historical depth (long shared history with the regions around it) and its 
geopolitical depth (strategic geographical position) force Turkey to realize the two 
goals mentioned above as well as give Turkey a unique capability to increase its 
influence, or soft power, in the region (Davutoglu, 2010). However, while 
excessively focusing on Turkey‟s stable parameter‟s in his power projections, 
Davutoglu fails to give due attention to potential power parameters such as 
51 
 
technological and military capabilities, which have central importance especially 
in modern warfare and power projections. 
 Davutoglu‟s idea of a more ambitious, dynamic and multi-dimensional 
foreign policy would find a conducive environment with some regional and 
domestic developments. First, the EU approved Turkey‟s membership bid to join 
the Union in the Helsinki Summit in 1999, which relegated Turkey‟s security-
oriented approach to foreign policy (Sozen, 2010). Second, with the coming of 
the JDP to power in 2002, Turkey focused on the EU reforms to become a full-
member. Persistence in pursuing the reforms and the EU membership improved 
micro- and macro-economic indicators. Third, the EU approved to begin 
accession talks in 2004, which increased Turkey‟s standing internationally and 
regionally (Aktas, 2010; Dalay & Friedman, 2013). These developments enabled 
Ankara to pursue a more ambitious and more multi-dimensional foreign policy 
compared to before. However, as Baskan (2011a) aptly observes, as soon as the 
Arab Spring uprisings started, especially in Libya and Syria, Davutoglu‟s 
ambitious and multi-dimensional foreign policy in the region fell apart beyond 
repair.  
Foreign Minister Davutoglu believed that Turkey‟s strategic depth, a 
combination of its geostrategic, historical and cultural ties to the region, brought 
with it responsibilities and opportunities, which could be activated to increase 
Turkey‟s regional and international prominence (Walker, 2007). To that end, 
Turkey exempted Lebanese, Syrian and Jordanian citizens from obtaining visas 
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and led efforts to create a small-scale customs union between the four actors, 
which PM Erdogan called as the Shamgen17. As mentioned earlier, such an 
economic opening reverberated in the region and allowed Turkey to reach other 
markets in the Arab Middle East, especially the Gulf region, through Syria, 
Lebanon and Jordan. Turkish products started to become more visible in the Gulf 
markets from agricultural produce to popular consumption materials such as 
Turkish soap operas and films. 
 Ankara utilized several tools to achieve its new foreign policy objectives 
under Davutoglu, two of which stand out. After embracing a zero-problems policy 
with neighbors and resolving some of the decades-long political and diplomatic 
problems, Turkey turned its attention to her neighbors and the broader region to 
share its experience and expertise. Mediation was Turkey‟s first foreign policy 
tool. Ankara mediated between the Israeli-Palestinian and the Israeli-Syrian 
sides, the Lebanese political/sectarian entities, Hamas and Fatah and the Iraqi 
political parties (Altunisik, 2008). Ankara‟s all-inclusive and equidistant mediation 
efforts to resolve regional problems and defuse political/sectarian tensions 
enhanced Turkey‟s soft power capabilities in the Middle East (Aras, 2009; 
Oguzlu, 2007). Using mediation and peace-making, Turkey came to be viewed 
as an impartial mediator and facilitator in regional disputes (Dalay & Friedman, 
2013; Smolen, 2012). Turkey was seen as a capable actor who could establish 
multidimensional relations with multilateral actors (Altunisik, 2008; Aktas, 2010). 
                                                 
17
 Shamgen is an allusion to the European Schengen visa. “Sham” means Damascus in Arabic and Turkish.   
53 
 
Regional political developments, at least until the Arab Spring, validated the 
wisdom of having zero-problems. However, with the Syrian quagmire, serious 
doubts about the wisdom of the practitioners of the zero-problems policy 
emerged.    
 Foreign aid and humanitarian assistance was another important foreign 
policy tool that Turkey has consistently utilized under the JDP governments. For 
example, according to the Global Humanitarian Assistance report 2013, with over 
$1billion in aid, 0.13% of its national wealth, distributed in 2012, Turkey came 
right after rich Western donors like the US ($3.8 billion), the EU ($1.9 billion) and 
the UK ($1.2 billion). With these figures, Turkey was the third most generous 
donor after Luxembourg and Sweden, and the first country in terms of how much 
the humanitarian assistance increased in 2012. According to Cevik (2013), 
through becoming an important donor, Turkey boosted its role as a trustable 
mediator in regional conflicts in addition to expanding its sphere of influence and 
soft power by engaging with the people on the ground. Although foreign aid as a 
foreign policy tool has worked effectively for quite a while now, including it in the 
Turkish foreign policy toolbox as a stable instrument is heavily dependent on the 
situation of the Turkish economy.  
 In addition to its humanitarian and state-building efforts in Africa, most 
notably in Somalia, Turkish foreign aid played an important political role as well. 
When the MB government in Cairo was in need of instant cash for its debt-
stricken economy, Morsi turned to Ankara. The Turkish government agreed to 
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deposit US$2 billion in the Egyptian Central Bank for the purpose of funding 
small and medium-sized enterprises, helping finance infrastructure projects and 
boosting foreign currency reserves. According to Bradley (2012), Ankara was 
utilizing bilateral foreign aid as a foreign policy tool to win lucrative contract for its 
growing manufacturing sector. A similar trend in Turkish foreign aid was also 
noticeable in Tunisia and Libya, where the Islamist governments had cordial 
relations with Ankara. With its equidistant and all-inclusive foreign policy 
approach and the utilization of mediation, humanitarian assistance and state-
building efforts, especially in Somalia and Libya, and foreign aid, especially those 
to the MB government in Egypt, Turkey increased its soft power immensely. 
However, in light of the political instability the Arab Spring brought to these 
countries and the recent economic troubles Turkey is undergoing, the eventual 
success of the policy of funding allies is highly doubtful.   
2.2.2. Qatari Foreign Policy Approach and Tools: 2004-2011 
 After gaining her independence in 1971, Qatar pursued an independent 
foreign policy; however, Riyadh exercised a significant level of influence on Doha 
especially in terms of basic security (Roberts, 2012). After Sheikh Hamad 
assumed power in 1995, Qatar has gradually become a leading, moderate, 
Muslim country with massive political and economic investments in nation 
branding. According to Peterson (2006) a small state like Qatar “should exploit a 
unique niche whereby it provides a service or commodity that benefits neighbors, 
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the region, or the broader world.” (p.741). As we shall see below, this service 
was mediation and conflict resolution endeavors. 
 Qatar‟s foreign policy is predicated on strengthening international peace 
and sovereignty (Constitution of the State of Qatar, 2004). Given its size and 
population as well as the regional instabilities, Qatar‟s new foreign policy vision 
aimed at maintaining and enhancing regional and domestic security and political 
stability (Khatib, 2013). In this regard, countering potential expansionist policies 
of neighboring countries, namely Iran, was an important Qatari foreign policy goal 
initially. Qatar enjoys considerable percentage of a Shiite population18 and 
shares its lifeline gas reserves, the Northern Field, with Iran. Hence, avoiding 
sectarian tensions in the region assumed an important consideration in the Qatari 
foreign policy behavior (Kamrava, 2011). Qatar would not want an uncontrollably 
emboldened Iran in the region; neither would it want to alienate Iran with hostile 
policies. Moreover, maintaining sovereignty and autonomy, vis-à-vis influential 
neighbors such as Saudi Arabia, was another important security consideration in 
Sheikh Hamad‟s foreign policy vision (Wright, 2011).  
 Qatari foreign policy tools were more prominently charted out after the 
security concerns of Qatar were alleviated with the US Army moving to the Al-
Udeid Air Base in 2003. Since then, mediation or peace-brokering has become 
                                                 
18
 According to a research conducted by the American-based Pew Research Center titled “Mapping the 
Global Muslim Population” more than 100,000 Shia people lived in Qatar in 2009, which was around 10% 
of the population. The study can be reached at http://www.pewforum.org/2009/10/07/mapping-the-global-
muslim-population   
A more recent report published by the United States Department of State titled “2011 Report on 
International Religious Freedom – Qatar” puts the percentage of Shia population in Qatar around 5-15%. 
The study can be located at http://www.refworld.org/docid/50210591c.html.   
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the most important Qatari foreign policy tool (Khatib, 2013). For Qatar, mediation 
is an integral foreign policy tool that aims at maintaining an active involvement in 
regional issues, enhancing and deepening its influence in the region and beyond. 
To this end, the Qatari foreign policy assumed immense dynamism in the Gulf 
and the broader Middle East due to the power vacuum in region (Abdulla, 2014). 
In fact, “peaceful resolution of international disputes” entered the Qatari 
Constitution, making Qatar one of few countries that have conflict resolution/ 
mediation in their constitution (Wright, 2011).  
 “The foreign policy of the State is based on the principle of strengthening  
 international peace and security by means of encouraging peaceful resolution of  
 international disputes...” (Constitution of the State of Qatar 2004, Article 7).  
In line with this article, Qatari mediation efforts proved successful in bringing a 
brewing civil war in Lebanon in 2008 to an end; in encouraging the government 
and the most influential rebel group to sign a ceasefire agreement and a peace 
framework to end the civil war in Darfur, Sudan, in 2010; and in bringing several 
cease-fires between the government and the Houthi rebels in Yemen in 2009, 
2010 and 2011. 
 Clearly, the Qatari foreign policy-makers were aware that increasing 
Qatar‟s visibility and soft-power in the international political arena would bolster 
Doha‟s chances for success in mediation (Kocgunduz, 2011; Kamrava, 2011; 
Gumus, 2013). Therefore, a successful campaign for nation-branding and 
reputation building as a progressive Muslim country was taking place (Barakat, 
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2012; Cooper & Momani, 2009). The establishment of the Al-Jazeera channel, 
hosting several sports events (1995 FIFA Under 20 World Cup, 2006 Doha Asian 
Games, 2011 Asian Football Cup, 2011 Pan Arab Games and 2022 World Cup), 
research and think-tank centers (Brookings and RAND Corporation) and 
distinguished international conferences (2012 UN Conference on Climate 
Change, 2012 UN Conference on Trade and Development) as well as active 
involvement in regional and international organizations (GCC, OIC and UNSC); 
investments in education (Qatar Foundation, Education City), culture (Museum of 
Islamic Arts, Qatar Philharmonic Orchestra, etc.) and aviation (Qatar Airways) 
increased Qatar‟s visibility and soft-power (Salem & Zeeuw, 2012; Gumus, 2013; 
Kamrava, 2014). Qatar earned extensive “subtle power” from these endeavors, 
cashing it successfully to support its image as an honest, impartial mediator and 
peace-broker, which Qatar used extensively in its foreign policy (Kamrava, 2013).  
 Another important foreign policy tool that Qatar has been utilizing is 
foreign aid, which was sometimes a part of its checkbook diplomacy. In addition 
to sending millions of US$ worth‟s of humanitarian aid to Africa and Asia as an 
instrumental foreign policy tool, Qatar gave foreign aid to countries affected by 
the Arab Spring. Egypt has received the lion‟s share from Qatar given its 
centrality in the Arab world and Sheikh Hamad‟s position that the newly emergent 
democratic Islam would dominate the Middle Eastern Arab region and it was in 
Doha‟s best interest to participate actively in this historic shift (Steinberg, 2012). 
Encouraged by large amounts of capital and the initial absence of other regional 
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and international actors (Philbrick & Shepherd, 2013; Abdulla, 2014; Koroglu, 
2014), ambitious Qatari foreign policymakers gave more than US$7.5 billion to 
Egypt throughout Morsi‟s presidency in the form of direct financial aid, 
emergency loan and liquefied natural gas ( Egypt Returns $2 Billion to Qatar, 
2013).  
 Similar to the Turkish case, the foreign policy approach and tools Qatar 
adopted extended its soft power immensely. Although Qatar was able to realize 
most of its foreign policy objectives with its foreign policy approaches and tools, 
the Arab Spring revolutions and counter-revolutions gave way to many 
challenges to the continuity of such policies.       
2.2.3. Analysis of Foreign Policy Approaches and Tools 
 Turkey and Qatar are both pro-Western, moderate Muslim countries with 
high-levels of integration into the global economy (Gumus, 2013). Although both 
countries tend to assert their distinctive positions on some international issues, 
they pursue a pragmatic and rationalist foreign policy. As the evolution of the 
Turkish and Qatari foreign policy in 2000s demonstrate, there was a confluence 
of favorable domestic and regional factors that augmented their international 
political and economic standing. Domestically, both countries enjoyed a period of 
political stability and unprecedented economic development under a strong 
leadership. Regionally, there was a power vacuum both in the Gulf Arab and the 
Middle Eastern Arab regions. Against this backdrop, the more both actors 
demoted their hard security concerns, the more confidence they gained in their 
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active, impartial, multi-dimensional foreign policy. Mediation and conflict 
resolution stood out as crucial tools in this respect. The more Turkey and Qatar 
utilized such foreign policy tools, the more they enhanced their regional and 
international prestige and soft power (Kamrava, 2014) as well as drew closer to 
one another in joint regional political endeavors. In this regard, President Gul‟s 
remarks are quite telling: 
 “We told him [Sheikh Hamad] in the meeting that Turkey appreciates Qatar for its 
effective role in the solution of several problems in the region. We expressed our 
gratitude once again to Qatar for its constructive and positive efforts with regard to the 
Middle East peace process, the settlement of the disputes between Israel and Palestine, 
the issues concerning Lebanon, Iraq, Darfur, and Yemen and in many other major 
problematic areas.” (Presidency of the Republic of Turkey, 2009)  
 Similarly, PM Erdogan observes that “We [Turkey and Qatar] have 
identical views on regional and international issues and we are doing our best 
with the State of Qatar in order to transform our region into a peace zone.” 
(Turkey and Qatar working for regional peace, 2013). The Turkish position is also 
reiterated by the Qatari side. For example, Salem Bin Mubarak Al Shafi, the 
ambassador of the State of Qatar in Ankara, states that Ankara and Doha 
“shared a similar point of view and… pursued similar policies regarding 
international matters, particularly regarding the conflicts in Syria, Lebanon, and 
Iraq and the Arab Spring” which “allowed further development in bilateral 
relations and stronger ties” which is “a positive force for the resolution of regional 
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problems” (Unal, 2014).  
 Examining the foreign policy approaches, objectives and the dominant 
foreign policy tools of both actors, we see that they both attach great importance 
to domestic and regional peace and stability. Ankara‟s zero problems with 
neighboring countries policy was considerably similar to Doha‟s willingness to 
solve the territorial disputes over the Hawar Islands and the Saudi border. For 
both Ankara and Doha, good relations with neighbors and a peaceful region 
means more opportunities for economic interdependence and safer markets for 
exports (Dirioz, 2009; Kamrava, 2014). In fact, Ankara and Doha cooperated in 
their mediation endeavors that aimed to bring the conflict among Lebanese 
parties to an end in 2011. 
 More importantly, both Turkey and Qatar have capitalized on their 
capability to offer generous amounts of foreign aid for humanitarian and 
development purposes to countries where the Arab Spring brought Islamist 
governments into power (see following sections). Ozturk (2011) argues that 
parallelism between both actors‟ multi-dimensional foreign policy approaches, 
mediation and conflict resolution efforts drew them gradually closer. It cannot be 
argued that similar foreign policy approaches and tools per se engendered closer 
Turkish-Qatari relations; however, their facilitative effect cannot be denied.  
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2.3. Convergence of Political Positions 
 In light of the previous section on the similarities between the foreign 
policy approaches, objectives and tools both actors utilized, Turkey and Qatar 
experienced a great level of convergence on many regional issues. There are 
two distinct dynamics that has driven this convergence. First, the leadership of 
both actors employ  an “Islamic”, not “Islamist19”, discourse to justify/legitimize 
their foreign policies and practices before their constituents and the regional 
public opinion. For example, according to G. Nonneman20 (personal interview, 
August 27, 2014), the understanding of Islam in the Qatari foreign policy makers 
is more of a “worldview” rather than an “ideology”. Therefore, unlike the Islamists, 
the objective of this worldview is not to impose radical change on society but to 
build popular consent. In this regard, both Turkish PM Erdogan and Foreign 
Minister Davutoglu have extensively relied on the concepts of Islamic 
civilization21, being a voice for Muslims, refusing radicalism and embracing 
tolerance and moderation22. In fact, PM Erdogan assumed the role of co-sponsor 
of United Nations Alliance of Civilizations initiative.  
 Similarly, the Qatari leadership has repetitively used a discourse which 
                                                 
19
 “Islamic”  is simply a politically neutral adjective while “Islamist” is usually used as a politically charged 
concept in many contexts. Islamists are claimed to maintain that Islam should be the sole guiding force in 
one’s social and personal life and that politics is a tool to change society in this direction.  
20
 Dr. Gerd Nonneman, Dean of Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service in Qatar, Doha, Qatar.  
21
 See Ahmet Davutoglu (1994): Civilizational Transformation and the Muslim World for theorization and 
practice of the civilizational discourse in contemporary politics.  
22
 See Burhan Duran’s (2013) article for a detailed discussion on discourse of Islamic civilization: 
Understanding the AK Party’s Identity Politics: A Civilizational Discourse and its Limitations 
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endorses the strengths of Islamic civilization, representing Muslims on the world 
arena and rejecting radical views23. To this end, Qatar Foundation has 
established a center for contribution to civilization and formed a committee for 
supporting alliance of civilizations, whereby “Islamic civilization” was promoted. 
Additionally, Qatar plays a key role in strengthening the UN Alliance of 
Civilizations initiative. The current Qatari Foreign Minister Khalid bin Mohammad 
Al-Attiyah states: 
 “Our support to this institution is not an improvisational issue or a political  
 issue, but rather a support based on a distinctive vision and a set Qatar's  
 foreign policy principles. We are for the promotion of dialogue among  
 cultures and civilizations24”.  
Such a discourse was important for both actors as it fed their soft power.  
 The second underlying dynamic that paved the way for foreign policy 
convergences is more pragmatist and less-ideologically driven. Following a 
rationalist line of thinking, both Ankara and Doha care about the security and 
stability of the region, which is vital for the well-being of their economies and their 
integration into the global economy (P. Aarts25, personal interview, August 27, 
2014; Baskan, 2014; Bayoumi, 2014b). Turkey is willing to win as much of the 
Middle Eastern market as possible in order to increase its exports. Similarly, 
                                                 
23
 See Sheikh Hamad’s UN speech at: http://www.unesco.org/dialogue/en/kahlifa.htm  
24
 See FM Khalid bin Mohammad Al-Attiyah’s speech at: http://www.gulf-
times.com/qatar/178/details/393479/fm-pledges-qatar%E2%80%99s-support-for-alliance-of-civilisations  
25
 Dr. Paul Aarts, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, the Netherlands.  
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Qatar needs to enhance its regional international standing in order to connect its 
huge gas reserves to nearby markets and beyond (Koroglu, 2014). Both 
countries were aware that accomplishing regional stability and peace, and 
cooperating with a leadership that they can easily work with would greatly 
increase their political and economic influence. This was a prime driver of 
converging positions. These two dynamics promote one another and they 
together cultivate a better ground for foreign policy convergences on many 
regional issues, which will be examined next. 
2.3.1. Position on Hamas 
 Turkey has repeatedly declared that Hamas is a legitimate representative 
of the Palestinian people because it won a clear electoral victory in transparent 
Palestinian elections in 2006 (Cetinoglu, 2009). Policymakers in Ankara 
maintained that inclusion of Hamas in mainstream Palestinian politics would 
promote democratization of Hamas; while excluding it would bring further 
radicalization. At the 2009 World Economic Forum in Davos, PM Erdogan stated: 
 
 “If we would like to see democracy take root, then we must respect… the 
people who have received the votes… If it‟s only Fatah who is present… that is 
not going to be sufficient… Hamas has to be taken into consideration as well 
because they are a part of that society, they have won an election, so they too 
must be included in this equation.”  
                (International Crisis Group, 2010)  
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Ankara argued that ostracizing a democratically elected Hamas would undermine 
efforts to draw it closer to mainstream politics and would expand Iranian 
influence over Hamas (Dalay & Friedman, 2013; B. Shahandeh26, personal 
interview, August 27, 2014). 
 Similar to the Turkish position, Qatar has extended diplomatic and 
financial support to Hamas arguing that branding a democratically elected 
government as terrorist would bolster the radical wing in Hamas (Haykel, 2013), 
which would be detrimental to the peace process. Qatar was able to broker a 
reconciliation agreement between Hamas and Fatah in Doha in 2012, which 
envisioned to create a unity government and include Hamas in mainstream 
Palestinian politics. Also, Sheikh Hamad became the first Arab leader to visit 
Hamas-controlled Gaza to break the Israeli blockade and declare to the 
international community that Hamas is a legitimate political entity (Cevikalp, 
2013). Similar to Ankara, Doha aimed at using its leverage in the international 
arena to include Hamas in the mainstream Palestinian politics as well as distance 
it from the Iran-Syria-Hezbollah axis (Al-Mughrabi, 2012). During his speech at 
the 6th Doha Forum in 2006, Sheikh Hamad criticized the international community 
for punishing Palestinian people for their democratic choices:  
“This important Arab experience should be supported and encouraged 
rather than putting pressure on it or interfering with the right of the people 
to choose their leaders to threaten to withhold aid to them. Challenging the 
                                                 
26
 Dr. Behzad Shahandeh, Tehran University, Tehran, Iran.   
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choice of the peoples will only result in fuelling feelings of despair and 
generate waves of wrath…the results of these elections reflects a 
commitment to what is decided by the collective will and the acceptance of 
the citizens‟ free choices. This calls upon advocates of democracy all over 
the world to respect the decision of the Palestinian people.” (Bibbo, 2006). 
 
In line with their strong belief that consolidation of security in the Middle 
East is dependent on the success of the democratic process, both Turkey and 
Qatar strove to end the international isolation of Hamas. To accomplish this goal, 
both actors hosted Hamas leaders as well as sought to mediate between Hamas 
and Fatah. In fact, with the Arab Spring, Hamas leadership relocated to Doha. All 
in all, both Turkish and Qatari leadership had genuine interest in bringing an end 
to the Palestinian suffering, which substantiated their discourse on Islamic 
civilization, being a voice for Muslims, refusing radicalism and embracing 
democracy, tolerance and moderation. Although this was an ideological position 
on the outside, it brought about pragmatic benefits to Ankara and Doha in the 
form of international and regional visibility and soft power (Kanat, 2010). Turkey 
and Qatar knew the importance of the Palestinian cause on the way to winning 
hearts and minds in the region. This was important for both actors as the most 
important foreign policy tools they used, i.e. conflict resolution, public diplomacy 
and moderation, required having a closer connection with the popular opinion.  
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2.3.2. Position on the Lebanese conflict  
 Lebanon, whose sectarian politics is notorious for political crises, has 
been an important site for Turkey and Qatar to show that the foreign policy 
principles of maintaining and enhancing regional security is not only in words. To 
this end, both Turkey and Qatar have undertaken several initiatives to resolve 
conflicts among Lebanese factions. To this end, Qatar worked tirelessly until an 
agreement was reached to end months of Lebanese political crisis in 2008 and 
saved the country from a potential civil war (Kamrava, 2011; Barakat, 2012). 
Similarly, Turkey sent troops to Lebanon as part of the UN peace keeping 
mission in 2006. Turkey‟s willingness to send troops to Lebanon to help prevent 
Beirut from sinking into deeper conflict with Israel, and Qatar‟s success in 
preventing a brewing Lebanese civil war in 2008 drew both actors to initiate joint 
mediation efforts to resolve another political crisis. Lebanon‟s already fragile 
political structure suffered yet another blow in 2011 when Hezbollah withdrew 11 
of its ministers from the cabinet, which culminated in the Lebanese government‟s 
collapse. As the situation was escalating in 2011, Turkish and Qatari Foreign 
Ministers have called on all Lebanese sides to compromise. However, the joint 
endeavor fell short of resonating with the Lebanese parties and the initiative 
failed to accomplish its goal, upon which both actors decided to end their 
mediation efforts. 
 Both Turkey and Qatar were actively involved in maintaining peace in 
Lebanon. This active involvement were due to three motivations. First, as stated 
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in their foreign policies, both actors strive to achieve peace and stability in all the 
region and Lebanon was a fertile ground to prove their discourse (Koroglu, 
2014). Second, both sides knew very well that Lebanon has a key importance in 
maintaining regional peace, given its complicated religious and political 
composition. If peace and stability in Lebanon was endangered, it would upset 
other regional dynamics. Third, genuine efforts to resolve conflicts in Lebanon 
would reverberate through the region and would mean prestige and public 
diplomacy for Turkey and Qatar as well as facilitate their relations with countries 
such as Iran, who enjoys a strong hold therein (Zweiri, 2014).    
2.3.3. Position on the Iranian nuclear program 
 Iran has increasingly become a central political actor in the Middle East 
after the Invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the fall of Saddam regime. Traditionally, 
most Sunni states in the Middle East, especially most GCC states, have always 
been mistrustful towards Iranian foreign policy and accused Iran of taking 
advantage of sectarianism and activating proxies in order to create instability in 
the region. Concerns about an increasingly assertive Iran with region-wide 
influence and with potential to acquire nuclear weapons intensified with Western 
allegations that Iran is pursuing a nuclear program that eventually aims to 
produce nuclear weapons (Shahandeh, 2014).  
 Alarmed at such a possibility, most of Iran‟s neighbors, more specifically 
Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the UAE and Kuwait, expressed their dismay of Iranian 
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intentions and have even suggested to assist a potential US operation on nuclear 
sites27. However, given their important political, economic and strategic interests, 
both Turkey and Qatar have pursued a different foreign policy from the West and 
the Gulf Arab countries, with the exception of Oman. According to Davutoglu, 
“Iran is the only land corridor for Turkey to reach Asia and the second source of 
energy for Turkey.” (Traub, 2011). In addition, for Turkey, Iran is an influential 
partner who can play “an active role to achieve peace and security in the region 
to end the Syrian crisis” (Bayoumi, 2014b). For Qatar, Iran is an important 
neighbor with whom Doha shares world‟s largest natural gas field, i.e. the North 
Field, as well as a potential gateway to the Turkish and European natural gas 
markets. A combination of such interests led the Turkish and Qatari foreign policy 
toward Iran‟s nuclear program converge to a great extent.       
 Although both Ankara and Doha are resolutely against potential Iranian 
nuclear weapons due to increasingly sectarian Iranian policies in the region, they 
have persistently avoided bandwagoning with neither the anti-Iran camp in the 
region nor the West (Cetinoglu, 2009). For example, Qatar voted against a 2006 
UNSC resolution, which demanded Iran to suspend uranium enrichment, arguing 
that the region was already in flames and therefore Iran should be granted 
channels of diplomacy and more time to guarantee the achievement of a 
peaceful solution (UN 5500th Meeting, 2006). Nassir Abdulaziz Al-Nasser, the 
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Qatari representative, stated that proceeding with the draft resolution would 
serve neither regional security nor the Council‟s unity and that this resolution 
would intensify the conflagration in the region.  
 Quite similar to Doha, Ankara voted against a 2010 UNSC Resolution, 
which imposed further sanctions on Iran in order to stop its nuclear program. 
Turkey, along with Brazil, argued that “the adoption of sanctions would negatively 
affect the momentum created by the Tehran Declaration and the overall 
diplomatic process” initiated by Turkey and Brazil (UN 6335th Meeting, 2010). 
Ankara also maintained that “the resolution‟s adoption should not be seen as an 
end to diplomacy” and “efforts towards finding a peaceful solution must be 
continued even more resolutely”. Additionally, both Ankara and Doha have 
expressly declared that they were against any military solution to the issue and 
that they would not allow their territory to be used for a military operation against 
Iran (Kocgunduz, 2011).     
2.3.4. Position on the Islamists’ rising influence in the region 
 Perhaps the most important political convergence that Ankara and Doha 
witnessed was their support for the rising influence of non-state actors namely 
the Islamists in the region, to the dismay of their neighbors as well as most of the 
international community (A. J. Al-Otaibi28, personal interview, August 27, 2014). 
What started as similar foreign policy outlooks in early 2000s, transformed swiftly 
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into a “political alignment” after it became clear that the Arab Spring revolutions 
could be a moment for the Islamist movements, i.e. MB (A. Kuru29, personal 
interview, May 23, 2014).  
 Although why Turkey and Qatar sided with the MB –a non-state actor, and 
then the state itself in some of the Arab Spring countries– is  still open to debate, 
there seems to be three possible explanations. First, given their persistent 
Islamic discourse and their vision that if Islamists are given opportunity they 
would embrace democracy and democratic processes, Ankara and Doha sided 
with the Islamists. This was an ideological choice, which would help Ankara and 
Doha to realize their identity-based goals in the region: helping create moderate 
Islamic governments (Qatar-Turkey Relations: Political and Economic 
Rapprochement, 2014) which in turn would improve lives of millions of Muslims in 
the region. However, this explanation fails to account for why Turkey was initially 
reluctant to topple the Gadhafi government and why both countries chose to turn 
a blind eye to the uprisings in Bahrain.  
 Second explanation is that both actors are pragmatic states in terms of 
political and economic opportunities, and they wanted to ride the MB wave 
(Abdulla, 2014; Koch, 2014; Nonneman, 2014), which seems to be more cogent 
than other explanations. Having invested in enhancing their soft power through 
branding and public diplomacy efforts on the ground, both Ankara and Doha 
wanted to cash in such assets as quickly as possible, given the regional power 
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vacuum and lack of potential regional or international competitors (Kamrava, 
2014). In fact, at the initial stages of the Arab Spring neither Saudi Arabia nor 
Egypt nor Iran seemed to be prepared for or willing to shape the changes. It was 
mostly Doha, and later Ankara, that seemed more enthusiastic and prepared to 
influence the newly emerging regional order. Similarly, the US assumed a 
favorable position toward the choice of the majority, i.e. the MB (Koroglu, 2014), 
which facilitated the position of Ankara and Doha. Although both actors, 
especially Turkey, was already in a win-win relationship with all of the Arab 
Spring countries, they thought that the power vacuum and lack of potential 
contenders would prove to be a much better win-win relationship (Abdulla, 2014). 
Moreover, both Ankara and Doha could become central players in the region as 
the newly emerging MB governments would be in their orbit as they viewed 
Ankara as source of democratic inspiration and Doha as a source of financial 
support (Cevikalp, 2013). 
 Third, Turkish and Qatari foreign policy approaches believed in change 
and people‟s choice. Being both US allies, who believe in “change in line with 
people‟s choice”, Turkey and Qatar have consistently emphasized that political 
reforms and economic development were interrelated and that  these two 
concepts together would bring change towards more democracy and socio-
economic development in the region (Gumus, 2013). In this respect, in his 2006 
Doha Forum opening speech, Sheikh Hamad stated: 
 “The controversy over reform that has started in the Middle East is 'necessary'  
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 and "must continue until citizens get their due share of political and economic  
 freedom... Establishing the regional security could not be completed unless  
 democratic practice make progress." (Bibbo, 2006). 
Another question arises here: if Turkey and Qatar were both in favor of change 
then why did they chose to side with the Islamists and not with the other more 
secular factions? The MB elements comprised the largest, the most well-
prepared social groups that were pushing for change and demanding democratic 
rights in the Arab Spring and therefore Ankara and Doha put their support behind 
them. This position maintains that even if it was other social dynamics, i.e. non-
Islamist actors, Ankara and Doha would still react the same way. For example, 
Ankara‟s pro-secular advice in Cairo in the early days of the MB government and 
the Turkish government‟s initial willingness to work with Bashar al-Assad on 
condition that he realized some political reforms point to such a principled 
approach. Similarly, according to a 2011 Bilgesam30 report, “the Qatari 
government has noted that many of the „Islamist‟ parties in question…, have 
declared strategies to tackle unemployment, education, democracy, and other 
such topical ills that plagued the past regimes” and therefore Qatar supported 
Islamists as they had a plan for tackling social issues and strengthening 
democracy. However, similar to the first explanation, the Bahraini case 
undermines the argument that Ankara and Doha are wholeheartedly behind 
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change and people‟s choice.   
2.3.5. Position on the Syrian crisis  
 The rapprochement between Turkey and Syria, prior to the Arab Spring 
uprisings, has been the most important political arena whereby Ankara tested its 
new foreign policy approach. At least until the Arab Spring, this new approach 
proved to be a great success. The Turkish-Syrian political, economic and socio-
cultural relations have witnessed dramatic improvements, which resonated with 
other neighboring countries and the region at large. For example, Turkey and 
Syria held high-level joint parliamentary meetings and abolished visa regimes to 
draw relations closer. Ankara and Damascus signed more than 60 agreements 
and memoranda of understanding on a wide array of issues from politics to 
commerce, security, culture, education, agriculture, health, transportation, 
environment, water (Ilgit & Davids, 2013). The Syrian leadership trusted the 
Turkish leadership so much so that they agreed to the Turkish mediation 
between Israel and Syria, which would end the occupation of the Golan Heights 
in return for Syrian recognition of Israel. A similar trend emerged in Turkish 
exports to Syria, which jumped from $184,267 in 2000 to $1,844,605 in 2011, an 
increase of more than 10 times (TUIK31, 2014). The tourist movements from 
Turkey to Syria followed a parallel trajectory which grew from 122,417 people in 
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2000 to 974,054 people in 2011 (TUIK32, 2014).  
 Simultaneously, Doha was establishing an extensive network of diplomatic 
and economic relations with Damascus with the help of its mediation overtures in 
Lebanon, where Syria was heavily involved. According to Gulbrandsen (2010), 
by the time the Doha Agreement between the Lebanese factions were signed in 
2008, Qatar was already one of the biggest investors in Syria. For example, the 
Qatari Diar invested $350 million in Ibn Hani Resort in Latakia and they 
established a $5 billion Qatari-Syrian Holding Company to invest in different real 
estate, tourism and industrial projects. Gulbrandsen also points to the 
Damascus-based Qatar National Bank Syria (QNBS), 49% of which was owned 
by the Qatar National Bank (QNB) while the Syria International Islamic Bank, 
Syria International Insurance Company, and Syrian-Qatari Takaful Insurance all 
operate under the Qatar International Islamic Bank (QIIB).  
 The relations between Turkey, Syria and Qatar gained a new momentum 
when the French and the Syrian Presidents as well as the Qatari Emir and 
Turkish PM met in Damascus in 2008 with a view to improving Lebanese-Syrian 
relations and enhancing stability and security in the Levant. A similar meeting 
took place among Erdogan, Asad and Sheikh Hamad in 2010 in Istanbul, where 
the three leaders as well as their foreign ministers voiced identical views about 
some of the most pressing regional issues such as the Israeli aggression, the 
reconciliation between Palestinian factions, political stability in Iraq and Iran‟s 
                                                 
32
 TUIK, figures retrieved from http://tuikapp.tuik.gov.tr/turizmapp/menuturizm.zul on May, 21, 2014.   
75 
 
right to possess nuclear energy (Assad, Erdogan and Sheikh Hamad meet in 
Istanbul, 2010).  
 Having built close personal connections with Bashar Al-Assad and the 
extensive diplomatic and economic investments, both the Turkish and the Qatari 
leadership tried to use such influence to expedite democratic reforms and 
weather the instability that the Arab Spring would instigate. However, such 
advice fell to deaf ears in Damascus, upon which both Turkish PM Erdogan and 
Qatari Emir stated their personal disappointment with the Asad regime 
(Beaumont, 2012). Once the violence between the Asad regime and opposition 
grew fierce, Ankara and Doha severed diplomatic relations, recognize the 
opposition and develop strategies to remove Asad from power.   
 Against this context, the Syrian case has served as the most crucial 
dynamic that motivated the Turkish and Qatari foreign policy alignment 
throughout the Arab Spring. Both Ankara and Doha have pursued a very 
proactive position towards the Syrian uprisings by coordinating the political, 
financial and logistical support they provided to the Syrian opposition (Ozturk, 
2011). On the political side, both Ankara and Doha became active advocates of 
the Syrian opposition. For example, Ankara advocated and facilitated the 
formation of the Syrian National Council (SNC) and recognized it as the official 
representative of the Syrian opposition as well as helping its military wing, i.e. the 
Free Syrian Army (FSA) by providing logistics on Turkish soil and sending them 
the weaponry coming from the Gulf. Also, Ankara brought the plight of Syrian 
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people to the international forums and tried to gather political support and 
recognition for the SNC. Ankara also supported a 2012 UN peace initiative, 
which envisioned a ceasefire and a UN Supervision Mission to be established in 
Syria, which failed due to lack of dialog between the regime and the rebels. 
Turkey also actively participated in another initiative proposed in Istanbul in 2012, 
i.e. the Friends of Syria, urging the Asad regime to realize the UN and Arab 
League reforms and recognize the SNC as a legitimate representative of Syrian 
people. Active diplomatic and political efforts to resolve the Syrian crisis 
motivated Ankara and Doha to recognize the newly formed Syrian National 
Coalition in 2012 in Cairo.  
 Similarly, Doha has shown great effort to push for a condemnation of the 
Syrian regime‟s actions at the Arab League in 2011, which was followed by the 
suspension of Syria‟s Arab League membership due to its failure to end army 
attacks on civilians and withdraw from cities. Given Doha‟s active advocacy, the 
Arab League proposed a peace plan to the Syrian regime which asked for 
accepting international monitors, removing troops from major towns and freeing 
political prisoners. In addition, Doha became an important capital, along with 
Istanbul, that hosted important opposition figures and the SNC meetings. Given 
its logistical support to the FSA, which went through Turkey, Doha worked 
closely with Ankara in coordinating its diplomatic and military support. However, 
as the Syrian crisis deepened, the crisis assumed an acutely sectarian 
dimension. The Turkish-Qatari line were closer to the MB elements in the SNC 
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while the Saudi position wished to exclude the MB and integrate more jihadist 
elements in the Syrian opposition. Such differences strengthened the Turkish-
Qatari political alignment (Tastekin, 2013) as both Ankara and Doha were wary 
of the jihadist elements and were favorable to the Syrian MB (Marufoglu, 2014).  
 Based on this narrative, several dynamics explains why Ankara and Doha 
cooperated closely on the Syrian crisis. First, as mentioned above, Turkey and 
Qatar have always wanted to enhance security and stability in the region and 
have cooperated to accomplish such goals as in Lebanon and Palestine. By 
showing a harmonious reaction to the Syrian crisis, both sides aimed to pressure 
the Asad regime to refrain from upsetting regional security which would have far-
reaching ramifications. However, as the uprisings intensified and Asad regime 
was blamed for committing several massacres, this position became increasingly 
more difficult for Ankara and Doha to sustain and they had to alter their strategies 
accordingly. Second, from a pragmatist perspective, both actors had large 
amounts of investments and economic interests in Syria and their joint calls to 
the Asad regime in the early stages of the uprisings were aimed at maintaining 
security and stability, which was crucial for their economic interests. This was 
especially true for Turkey as Syria has been the most critical link to the rest of the 
Arab Middle East in Turkey‟s new foreign policy approach, which promoted 
economic interdependence in the region. If this link was broken, Ankara‟s zero 
problems policy as well as its regional economic clout would be seriously 
disrupted.  
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 Another reason why Ankara and Doha cooperated in the Syrian crisis, 
according to Ahmed (2013), which sounds a little far-fetched, was Syria‟s 
reluctance to accept a natural gas pipeline project that would transport Qatari 
natural gas through Arab countries to Turkey and to Europe, which would 
enhance Qatar‟s regional influence as a source of reliable energy source. Fourth, 
on the ideological side, close Turkish-Qatari cooperation on the Syrian crisis was 
augmented by their strong conviction that the imminent dynamics of change 
would catapult the Islamists, i.e. MB elements, to the center of regional politics 
and therefore it was in their best interest to support the MB elements, as the 
strongest alternative of all. Ankara and Doha anticipated that the newly emerging 
“Islamist belt” countries, including Syria, would yield more cooperative 
governments (Abdulla, 2014; Sager, 2014; Al-Otaibi, 2014). In addition, being 
wary of the increasing Iranian influence in the region, both Turkey and Qatar 
expected that a new government in Damascus, which would technically bolster 
Sunni Islamists‟ position in Syrian politics, would confine Shia-Iranian influence 
on the Alewi-dominated Syria and Hezbollah-dominated Lebanon (Kuru, 2014). 
 In summary, foreign policy objectives and tools utilized by Ankara and 
Doha created several venues for both actors to enhance their regional 
cooperation. Although their foreign policy approaches and the instruments they 
employed to accomplish their foreign policy objectives facilitated a high level of 
convergences regarding pressing regional issues, these dynamics alone does 
not present a complete picture of the evolution and the nature of Turkish-Qatari 
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relations. In order to provide a complete account of these dynamics, the following 
chapter analyzes the regional and domestic factors that paved the way for closer 
relations and the political alignment between Ankara and Doha.  
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CHAPTER III: Regional and Domestic Dynamics of the Evolution 
of the Turkish-Qatari Relations (2002-2013) 
As stated in the previous chapter, the foreign policy approaches, 
objectives and tools of both Turkey and Qatar facilitated the political 
convergences between the two actors. This was evident in the similar foreign 
policies Turkey and Qatar formulated in face of several regional issues such as 
the Palestinian problem, the Lebanese conflict, the Iranian nuclear program, the 
increasing influence of the MB elements in the Arab Spring countries and the 
Syrian Crisis. Ankara and Doha pursued not only parallel objectives throughout 
all of this regionally significant issues, but they also utilized similar political 
instruments to achieve their goals such as conflict resolution, mediation, 
humanitarian assistance and foreign aid.  
Converging foreign policies and tools per se falls short of explaining the 
cordial nature and rapid pace of the Turkish-Qatari relationship as they do not 
necessarily lead to better and closer relations. Therefore, this chapter examines 
the regional political context as well as the domestic dynamics such as 
leadership, identity politics and interests (political, strategic and economic) that 
were influential. Conducive regional dynamics prepared the ground for the 
domestic dynamics above to become focal determinants of this relationship. 
Especially the ambitious leadership on both sides and their concurring visions 
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regarding the rising power of Islamists helped Ankara and Doha establish 
exceptionally cordial relations, compared with some of the regional powers.      
3.1. Regional Dynamics of Turkish-Qatari Relations 
On the regional level, the first and the most important issue was the 
Invasion of Iraq in 2003, which resulted in not only political instability but also 
greater Iranian influence in the Middle East, especially in Iraq, Lebanon and even 
Palestine (Zweiri, 2014; Marufoglu, 2014; Abdulla, 2014). With the failure of the 
American plans in Iraq in the post-Saddam era, the US has grown increasingly 
more reluctant to be involved in regional problems. This historic juncture would 
later create an optimal opportunity for Turkey to advance its relations with the 
Arab Middle East in general and the GCC countries in particular.  
The American reluctance to engage with the pressing regional problems 
and the conflict over who should govern Iraq resulted in a power vacuum, which 
weakened the Sunni political actors while strengthening the position of the 
majority Shia political actors in Iraq (ICG, 2010; Kardas, 2006). Given its 
considerable influence on the Shiite politicians, Iran easily filled in the power 
vacuum in Iraq, boosting its assertive political stance vis-à-vis the regional 
heavyweights such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia (Shahandeh, 2014). As the 
Jordanian King‟s argument of “Shiite Crescent” began to materialize and as the 
traditional leaders of the Arab world, i.e. Saudi Arabia and Egypt, retreated into 
oblivion, Turkey and Qatar, both Sunni-majority countries, emerged as new 
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players willing to fill in the power vacuum (Momani & Ennis, 2012). According to 
Koroglu (2014), what paved the way for Turkish and Qatari political positions and 
interests to draw closer to each other at this critical juncture had to do with a 
regional urge to counter-balance surging Iranian influence. 
Marufoglu (2014) concurs with Koroglu and states that “in addition to 
Turkey‟s and Qatar‟s pro-Palestinian discourse, Iran‟s increasing regional 
influence was a major determinant in the evolution of the Turkish-Qatari relations 
to its current level.” He suggests that the GCC decision to announce Turkey a 
strategic partner in 2008 was a combination of the two factors above, namely the 
American reluctance to shape the regional power vacuum and the resultant 
surge of Iranian influence. Qatar was one of the first countries expressing interest 
in Turkey becoming a strategic partner. Qatar viewed Turkey as an influential 
political actor and a militarily powerful partner vis-à-vis Iran (Koroglu, 2014; 
Nonneman, 2014). This strategic relationship between the GCC and Turkey 
paved the way for formulating common positions over regional issues and 
furthering economic ties (Baskan, 2014).   
Turkey‟s EU membership efforts had a profound effect on Ankara‟s 
growing relations with the GCC in general and Qatar in particular. Initially, when 
“the EU decided to formally start accession talks with Turkey on the 3rd October, 
2005, people in the Middle East have started to seriously consider the idea that 
Turkey‟s potential entry into the EU could also help them develop/modernize and 
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live in peace with the West.” (Oğuzlu, 2007, p.89). However, when the EU 
seemed to postpone Ankara‟s full membership on grounds of several political 
and economic concerns, Turkey was disillusioned with a stalled EU accession 
process (Barkey, 2011). When Ankara realized that the Brussels was not 
genuinely interested in Turkey‟s full membership, the Turkish government 
intensified efforts to integrate Turkish economy with that of the Middle East with a 
view to increasing Turkey‟s strategic and economic value (Ulrichsen, 2014; Al-
Otaibi 2014; Sager, 2014).  
Moreover, according to Koroglu (2014), another dynamic that gave 
meaning to these regional factors, which paved the way for closer Turkish-Qatari 
relations, was the tacit American approval of the policies of these two friendly 
actors. For the Americans, it was a pragmatic choice to support the policies of 
Turkey and Qatar, both pro-Western countries that are well integrated into the 
global economy. Until the onset of the Arab Spring, the Turkish-Qatari relations 
revolved around mutual economic interests and maintaining regional peace. The 
Arab Spring revolts were probably the most influential regional dynamic that gave 
a fresh dimension to the relations between Ankara and Doha. Especially with the 
Arab Spring revolts in Egypt and Syria, relations between Ankara and Doha 
moved towards a political alignment, which will be examined next.  
84 
 
3.1.1 Arab Spring: Changing Regional Dynamics  and the Turkish-Qatari 
Political Alignment (2011-2013)   
The initial euphoric predictions about the outcomes of the Arab Spring 
started to fade away quickly. Instead, internal frictions, foreign meddling, 
sectarian divides and even civil war began to appear as more realistic outcomes 
of the Arab Spring. Bar the initial ecstatic expectations, regional realities that the 
Arab Spring has ushered proven to be an important game changer which has left 
its mark not only on Turkey-GCC relations but also on Turkish-Qatari relations. 
Like most capitals, Ankara was caught with surprise when demonstrations in 
Tunisia grew into mass protests and calls for the fall of the Ben Ali regime. The 
quick and peaceful success of the Tunisian people in changing their decades old 
corrupt and authoritarian regime was greeted with joy by many sections of the 
Arab societies in North Africa, the Levant and the Gulf, who demanded 
immediate political change and better economic conditions.  
When the revolutions hit Egypt, the Turkish leadership was quick to call for 
the fall of the Mubarak regime on Al-Jazeera. For Ankara, Mubarak proved to be 
a difficult partner who was disturbed by Turkey‟s growing influence in the Arab 
world (Koroglu, 2014). Similarly, due to its troubled relations with the Mubarak 
regime for over a decade and its good relations with the opposition in Egypt, 
namely the MB, Qatar rushed to champion the democratic rights of the Egyptian 
people through Al-Jazeera. Both Ankara and Doha envisioned to realize their 
foreign policy goals and increase their clout in Egypt if Islamists, i.e. the MB, 
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were to assume power(Tocci, 2011). Therefore, they found each other as natural 
allies. 
Similarly, Syrian uprisings proved to be another important phase in the 
Turkish-Qatari political alignment. Both Turkey and Qatar enjoyed extraordinarily 
close relations with the Asad regime and both countries had invested heavily 
therein, as was mentioned above. Therefore, the leadership in both countries 
tried to convince Damascus to introduce political reforms, even nominally, to 
weather the uprisings. By the summer of 2011 when the violence between the 
Asad regime and the opposition intensified, both Turkey and Qatar called for 
international intervention, which fell to deaf ears. For Ankara and Doha, Syria 
could turn out to be another country in the region where the MB elements could 
become the new government. This would not only bring another reliable ally for 
Ankara and Doha, but it would also cripple Iran‟s influence on Syria and 
Lebanon, where Shiite political actors enjoy great popular support base. Having 
economic and political stakes in the Syrian situation, Turkey and Qatar began to 
provide political, financial and logistical support for the Syrian opposition. Given 
their converging foreign policy objectives, Turkey and Qatar witnessed an 
unprecedented political alignment with each other when Syria turned into an 
ideological (MB and Saudi-Emirati axis vis-à-vis the Turkish-Qatari axis) and 
sectarian (Iranian influence on Syria and Lebanon) battleground beyond just the 
Syrian government and the opposition. 
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By the time Tunisia and Egypt were well under the MB governments and 
there was high probability that others could follow, the differences between the 
Turkey-Qatar-Egypt axis on the one hand and the Saudi-UAE axis on the other 
began to surface (Simsek, 2013). For the latter, democratically elected MB 
elements posed an ontological threat to their survival. A successful Egypt under 
the MB government could grow to be an example for the popular opinion in the 
Gulf. This is in turn could ruin decades-old monarchies in Saudi Arabia and 
elsewhere.  
Due to its central role in Arab politics, its huge population and colossal 
potential as an important regional ally, Doha and Ankara extended political, 
financial and logistical support for the Morsi government (Ulrichsen, 2014), which 
was examined in earlier sections. As evidenced by the Egyptian and Syrian 
cases, the Arab Spring proved to be an arena whereby the Turkish and Qatari 
foreign policy visions towards the Arab Middle East converged to a great extent. 
Towards the end of Sheikh Hamad‟s reign, which ended in June 2013, Turkey 
and Qatar enjoyed a political alignment, at the expense of worsening relations 
with Saudi Arabia and the UAE (Sager, 2014; Al-Otaibi, 2014). 
Why did the Arab Spring serve as a springboard for the Turkish-Qatari 
political alignment? There were several dynamics that motivated this political 
alignment. First, Islamist elements in JDP‟s constituency (JDP is not supported 
by Islamists per se) approved of the potential success of Islamist rising in the 
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region and supported or was at least sympathetic to the JDP government‟s 
initiatives in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Syria as evidenced by an array of pro-
Islamist demonstrations, humanitarian assistance activities organized by several 
conservative civil societies and numerous publications to mold public opinion. In 
fact the JDP leadership were of the same opinion as most of their constituency, 
and in some instances these demonstrations and humanitarian assistance 
campaigns were orchestrated by the government itself (Anonymous Turkish 
diplomat, June 2, 2014). Similarly, the Qatari leadership, who had cordial 
personal connections with and favorable views towards the MB elements in most 
Arab countries, saw in the Arab Spring a potential region-wide dominance of the 
Islamist movements.  
Second, both Ankara and Doha believed that if Arab uprisings resulted in 
Islamist governments, they would enjoy more regional influence (Nonneman, 
2014; Aarts, 2014) and better economic opportunities (Kamrava, 2014). Third, 
both Ankara and Doha supported the popular uprisings as the most principled 
approach given their support for people‟s choice and promotion of democracy. 
However, their lack of support for the Bahrain‟s popular uprising undermines this 
position. As the conflicts in Syria and Egypt aggravated, Ankara and Doha‟s 
active involvement in the Arab Spring began to take a more partial and sectarian 
character, which ruined both actors‟ reputation as trustable mediators. According 
to Beaumont (2012), the Arab Spring, the Libyan uprisings to be exact, “marked 
a "qualitative change" in Qatar's foreign policy from an "activist" but militarily 
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"unthreatening" stance to active intervention.” (p.6). Also, Qatar‟s foreign policy 
objectives in Syria and Egypt, especially its unwavering support for the MB, 
created serious fractures in its relations with important GCC members such as 
Saudi Arabia and the UAE.  
According to Baskan (2011a), the Syrian quagmire undermined Turkey‟s 
positive image as an impartial actor who could speak to all conflicting sides in the 
region. In addition, for many secular and liberal Arabs, Turkey‟s position on the 
Egyptian crisis and its support for the MB undermined its potential as a 
successful role model who could engage differing layers of society, from ultra-
seculars to Islamists, into a peaceful democracy (Abdulla, 2014; Arab World 
Favors Turkey, May 18, 2010). Due to losing their reputation as impartial political 
actors who could talk to all sides of regional problems and having seen the 
stakes of being on the losing side, Turkey and Qatar intensified their 
coordination, which eventually drew them even much closer, politically and 
economically. Only time will tell how successful the Turkish-Qatari political 
alignment was in achieving their objectives throughout the Arab Spring. 
Regional dynamics, especially the Arab Spring and its groundbreaking 
effects in the region, are very important in understanding the evolution of the 
Turkish-Qatari relations from 2002 to 2013. However, these dynamics alone 
cannot give a comprehensive understanding unless they are corroborated with 
domestic dynamics. Thus, the next section examines the role of leadership, 
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identity politics and interests (political, strategic and economic), which are the key 
determinants of the nature and pace of relations between the two actors. 
3.2. Domestic Dynamics 
 Several important domestic dynamics transformed the newly emerging 
relations between Ankara and Doha at the turn of the century into a political 
alignment before Sheikh Hamad abdicated power in the summer of 2013. On the 
Turkish side, the most important catalyst of Turkey‟s return to the Middle East 
was initiated in the aftermath of the capture of Ocalan, the leader of the 
separatist terrorist organization, i.e. PKK. With the PKK losing its military and 
logistical capabilities to a great extent, Ankara began to follow a less security-
oriented foreign policy, which brought about a thaw in relations with Syria and 
later Iraq and Iran, whose cooperation was instrumental in abating the Kurdish 
separatism (Ismael & Aydin, 2003). Also, in addition to strengthening the Turkish 
civil society, the decline of the security-oriented policies initiated a process 
whereby Turkish domestic and international politics grew increasingly 
demilitarized. Gradually, the Turkish Armed Forces, known for its rigid 
secularism, lost its influence on the Turkish political scene, which in turn paved 
the way for a more multi-dimensional foreign policy with the Muslim Middle 
Eastern nations (Altunisik & Tur, 2005). In addition, the Turkish economy that 
plunged with 1999, and 2001 economic crises, began to show dramatic 
increases from 2002 onwards. For example, according to World Bank 
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Development Indicators (2014), while Turkish economy shrank 5.6% in 2001, it 
quickly picked up and registered a 6.1% growth in 2002 and a staggering 9.3% 
growth in 200433. Business associations such as TUSIAD34, TUSKON35 and 
MUSIAD36 rushed to the Middle East in general and the Gulf in particular to gain 
new markets for Turkish products (Koroglu, 2014) and attract FDI in different 
sectors. Consequently, there was dramatic interest in the Middle East, both at the 
governmental and the civil society levels. 
 On the Qatari side, the economy has witnessed unprecedented growth 
rates. For example, according to World Bank (2014), while Qatar grew only 3.3% 
in 2001, this figure has soared to 19.2% in 2004 and 26.1% in 2006, one of the 
highest in the world. Economic development and the absence of other regional 
heavyweights, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, coincided with a visionary 
leadership in office, which allowed Qatar to venture into brave foreign policy 
initiatives to assert its regional and international presence. In terms of the 
regional security, Doha was under the US security umbrella with the relocation of 
the US Middle East Combat Air Operations Center from Prince Sultan Air Base in 
Saudi Arabia to Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar. In addition, a strong economy 
brought about a content public, which minimized the potential for domestic 
political distractors. Moreover, as mentioned before, similar to the Turkish zero-
problems with neighbors policy, Doha resolved its border disputes with her 
                                                 
33
 For more detailed data please refer to: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG  
34
 TUSIAD: Turkish Industry and Business Association 
35
 TUSKON: Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists 
36
 MUSIAD: Independent Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association  
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neighbors.  
 All of the domestic dynamics above, coupled with the regional political 
context described above, nurtured a conducive environment for both Turkey and 
Qatar to cooperate in almost all spheres. Additionally, the enthusiasm of 
leadership on both sides, the role of identity politics and mutual political, 
economic and strategic interests facilitated closer relations between Ankara and 
Doha, which will be covered next.  
3.2.2. Leadership 
 Individual-level variables in foreign-policy making are as important as 
systemic and structural variables as it is the leadership of a country that gives 
meaning to external structural determinants (Hudson, 2005). This is especially 
valid in Turkey and, by extension, the Middle East where constraints on 
democratic institutions are still abundant (Sayari, 1996; Ozbudun, 2000). In this 
sense, the role of leadership has been an instrumental, if not the most 
instrumental, catalyst in the evolution of Turkish-Qatari relations (Cevikalp, 2013; 
Unal, 2014; Koroglu, 2014; Marufoglu, 2014; Bayoumi, 2014a). The leadership in 
both Ankara and Doha have been extremely powerful political figures from 2002 
until 2013, both domestically and globally, given their strong leadership 
capabilities and ambitious foreign policy goals. Both the Turkish PM Erdogan and 
the Foreign Minister Davutoglu have been the most influential figures in Turkish 
foreign policy-making and execution in more than a decade. They shared a 
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similar regional and international foreign policy vision and goals with the Qatari 
Emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa and the Foreign Minister Hamad bin Jassim. 
 Kenneth Katzman, a Gulf expert at the Congressional Research Service, 
contend that “the Emir and Hamad bin Jassim have a lot of confidence, and they 
take a lot of risks (cited in Bollier, 2013). Also, according to Michael Stephens, an 
analyst at the Royal United Services Institute, the Emir and Hamad bin Jassim 
were together behind the foreign policy initiatives of Qatar and they are the 
foreign policy-makers who made Qatar “Qatar” (Bollier, 2013). Similar views were 
expressed by the Turkish Premier Erdogan about Hamad bin Jassim: 
 
“… [is] a wise personality, a model leader and a man of broad vision, [who] has 
played an important role in the development of his country and the rise in his 
people's level of affluence… His contributions toward the resolution of problems 
in the region… and his diplomatic efforts during the Arab Spring, are worthy of 
commendation. I am also pleased by the momentum gained in Turkish-Qatari 
relations and by the fact that my close friend and I share the same vision when it 
comes to international affairs”.  
        (Hamad bin Jassim bin Jaber al-Thani, 2012) 
 Quite analogous to the Emir and Foreign Minister (FM) Hamad bin Jassim,  
the PM Erdogan and FM Davutoglu have been characterized by strong 
brinkmanship which sometimes creates contention with the West and the 
regional powers. However, their brinkmanship does not stem from an inherently 
anti-Western sentiment, rather the leadership on both sides excel at shrewd 
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tactics that enhance their regional popularity as well as increase the influence of 
their respective countries. According to Ozel (2009), Davutoglu‟s ambitious 
Turkish foreign policy objectives, which is quite similar to Qatar‟s, do not confront 
the West, but rather it is complementary to the Western foreign policy goals in 
the Middle East. Similar to the Emir and Hamad bin Jassim who capitalized on 
the power vacuum in the Arab Middle East and beyond, PM Erdogan and 
Foreign Minister Davutoglu share a vision wherein Turkey expands its influence 
and fills in the power vacuum in the region. According to Uslu (2009, para. 2). 
 “Both Davutoglu and Erdogan used identical themes and maximized Turkey's  
 regional importance, as well as used the phrase "zero-problem policy" to  
 characterize the country's relations with the Muslim world and the West. It  
 appears that Erdogan's foreign policy statements are strongly influenced by  
 Davutoglu.” 
 Leadership of both countries was an important dynamic that has 
augmented Turkish-Qatari relations. According to Ahmet Demirok37, “the 
constant coordination between the Turkish and Qatari leadership as well as their 
keenness to develop policies in line with their broader foreign policy visions 
motivated a closer relationship between the two actors” (Demirok, May 22, 2014, 
personal communication). Similarly, Salem Bin Mubarak Al Shafi, Qatar‟s 
ambassador to Ankara observes that "bilateral relations “[between Turkey and 
Qatar] gained momentum in the 2000s. After 2011, the bilateral relations reached 
a level of harmonization and coordination thanks to the wisdom of the two 
                                                 
37
 His Excellency (HE) Ahmet Demirok, Turkish Ambassador to Doha, Qatar. 
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countries' leaderships." (Unal, 2014).  
3.2.3. Identity Politics  
 For many, identity has occupied an important role in the formulation and 
evolution of the Turkish-Qatari relations (Gumus, 2013; Koroglu, 2014; Kuru, 
2014; Abdulla, 2014; Marufoglu, 2014; Bayoumi, 2014; Sager, 2014; Al-Otaibi 
2014). Two important factors stand out that lend support to this position. First, 
both the Turkish and the Qatari leaders have emphasized the role of socio-
cultural affinities and historical ties in their cordial relations. For example, 
according to both HE Ahmet Demirok, Turkey‟s ambassador to Doha, and HE 
Salem Bin Mubarak Al Shafi, Qatar‟s ambassador to Ankara, at the root of this 
close bilateral relationship lie the historical ties and cultural affinities, which 
facilitated adopting convergent foreign policy principles and policies (Bayoumi 
2014a; Unal, 2014). Similar views were expressed by PM Erdogan and the Emir 
Sheikh Hamad who have repeatedly emphasized the “deep-rooted common 
history stretching back centuries” on various occasions. 
 The second factor that speaks to the significance of identity in the 
relations is the coordinated support both leadership extended to the Palestinian 
cause and the MB elements throughout the Arab Spring. According to K. 
Ulrichsen38 (personal interview, May 27, 2014), given its conservative, religious 
constituency on whom Erdogan depends, identity has played a crucial role for 
                                                 
38
 Dr. Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Fellow for the Middle East, Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public 
Policy, Houston, TX, USA.   
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Ankara‟s decision to focus on relations with Qatar and advocate the Palestinian 
cause and the MB. According to Kuru (2014) “Both Erdogan and the Emir seem 
to have supported Muslim Brothers in various Arab countries. Thus, their support 
to the “Arab Spring” was an example of identity politics, based on Islamism.”  
 Koroglu (2014) contends that the Palestinian cause, especially after the 
Israeli War on Gaza in 2009, has drawn Erdogan and Sheikh Hamad closer. 
“Given their ummah-oriented foreign policy visions and goals”, continues 
Koroglu, “they sought to improve the lives of Muslims in the Middle East and 
elsewhere”. Koroglu also maintains that, in addition to his vision of unity among 
the Muslim countries, Sheikh Hamad‟s pan-Arab views motivated Qatar to throw 
its support not only behind the Palestinians but also the MB. Somewhat different 
from Koroglu, Abdulla (2014) contends that although the Qatari Emir entertains 
pan-Arab views and this is reflected in Qatar‟s foreign policy, support for the MB 
and the resultant dispute between the GCC members is not pan-Arab. Similar to 
the Qatari Emir, for Erdogan, one of the most prominent motivations for 
supporting the Palestinian cause and the MB was to enhance Islamic solidarity 
and safeguard the ummah‟s interests (Marufoglu, 2014).  
 It can be argued that the two factors enumerated above are closely 
intertwined with personal beliefs of the leadership on both sides. For example, in 
an interview with the New York Times, Erdogan stated:  
 ''Before anything else, I'm a Muslim. As a Muslim, I try to comply with the  
 requirements of my religion. I have a responsibility to God, who created me, and I  
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 try to fulfill that responsibility. But I try now very much to keep this away from my  
 political life, to keep it private.''  
                 (Sontag, 2003)  
Even though Erdogan claims that he tries to keep his beliefs away from politics, 
Yavuz (2009) maintains that “From Erdogan‟s perspective, a nation is a religious 
community and the people of Turkey constitute a nation by sharing Islam” 
(p.131). Erdogan‟s history of activism and political discourse under the National 
Outlook Movement39 points to a connection between his deeply-rooted 
ideological stance and his foreign policy vision under the JDP governments. 
However, Erdogan has repeatedly denied its past and emphasized that his views 
have changed over time40. 
 Similarly, Sheikh Hamad gave clues to the most instrumental component 
of his identity at his abdication message where he emphasized his care for the 
Arab unity: “We believe that the Arab world is one human body, one coherent 
structure, that draws its strength from all its constituent parts.” According to 
Telhami (2013), Sheikh Hamad read the popular dynamics in the region aptly 
and established his country‟s foreign policy in favor of the Islamic and Arab 
identity, which showed itself in his support for the Palestinians and the MB. Al-
Jazeera network assumed a vital role in materializing Sheikh Hamad‟s vision of 
                                                 
39
 National Outlook Movement, led by Necmeddin Erbakan, emerged in the 1970s as a reaction to the 
social and economic ills that were thought to be caused by the strictly secular and Westernized nature of the 
Turkish state. Promoting a program of cultural renewal, moral development, social justice and 
industrialization, the National Outlook stressed religious education and participation in politics. As an 
ardent student of this movement, Erdogan was and still is frequently blamed as an Islamist by the secular 
state establishments both in Turkey and the West.  
40
 On many occasions, PM Erdogan declared that he “changed his National Outlook shirt”.  
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representing the whole Islamic ummah by becoming a voice for the voiceless 
(Koroglu, 2014). Sheikh Hamad‟s political vision could have both influenced and 
been influenced by the MB elements that migrated to the Gulf in the 1960s, one 
of the most notable of whom is the Egyptian Islamic theologian Sheikh Yusuf Al-
Qaradawi, who is known for his passionate support for the MB governments in 
the Arab Spring countries. Sheikh Hamad‟s pan-Ummah stance on the 
Palestinian issue and Qatar‟s support for Hamas cannot be explained with mere 
pragmatism as siding with the people‟s choice on such issues has been much 
costlier than staying neutral.  
 International relations is an arena for rational, self-interested state actors 
who pursue policies to ascertain their survival in a chaotic political milieu. Thus, 
domestic dynamics, the role of leadership and the effects of identity politics per 
se fall short of providing a complete account of the evolution of Turkish-Qatari 
relations from 2002 to 2013. The next part examines the place of interests in 
Turkish-Qatari relations within the specified time period.  
3.2.4. Interests 
Although identity is an important consideration in foreign policy-making in 
Ankara and Doha, their policies are not purely ideological. As stated in the 
foreign policy analysis of both countries above, Turkish and Qatari foreign 
policies are more pragmatic and conciliatory than they seem. According to 
Kamrava (2014) and Gulbrandsen (2010), for example, Qatari foreign policy is 
heavily influenced by the trade and investment opportunities. Similar views are 
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expressed about Turkish foreign policy making by Kirisci (2009), who argues that 
economic factors, other than anything else, have become extraordinarily 
important in shaping Turkish foreign policy. Along similar lines, Turkish and 
Qatari support for the Palestinian cause and the MB could be related to Ankara‟s 
and Doha‟s pragmatic calculations rather than purely ideological concerns. 
According to this line of reasoning, Turkish and Qatari overtures to the 
Islamists seem to have two goals. First, winning the general public approval 
which is generally sympathetic to the Islamists. Although both actors seem not to 
have accomplished much by extending their support to Hamas, they have won 
the public opinion in general. However, given the political structures in the Middle 
East and the fact that general public opinion cannot necessarily be reflected in 
the politics due to a lack of democratic institutions, winning the public opinion 
have not brought about tangible outcomes for both actors. Second, Ankara and 
Doha projected to expand their regional influence greatly when/if Islamists would 
be on the winning side. However, this also seemed increasingly more difficult 
given the political picture of the Arab Spring countries and the forces that shape 
it. Based on such considerations, it can be argued that mutual political, strategic 
and economic interests, not necessarily purely ideological motivations, were 
more instrumental in establishing cordial relations between Ankara and Doha 
while their relations were deteriorating with other regional powers. 
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3.2.4.1. Political interests 
 Politically, Ankara viewed Doha as a safe gateway to the Gulf, an 
increasingly important sub-region that has gradually become the center of Arab 
politics and economics. According to Cevikalp (2013), the political power vacuum 
in the region and Qatar‟s active foreign policy rendered Doha a natural ally for 
Ankara, who needed partners in its active foreign policy in the region. Ankara not 
only anticipated to work more harmoniously with the pro-Western and forward 
thinking leadership in Doha, but also wanted to benefit from its political influence 
in the region. In addition, Ankara realized that Doha has established strong 
political connections across the region with both the governments and the 
opposition forces such as the MB (Marufoglu, 2014). These were all important 
assets for Ankara which could bring more influence and a web of constructive 
relations in the broader Middle East.  
 Parallel to Turkey‟s motivations, Qatar also had political interests in 
developing cordial relations with Ankara. Doha needed regional allies to pursue 
its regional foreign policy goals. Turkey, with its forward thinking, Sunni Muslim 
and pro-Western government that concurs on most regional issues with Doha, 
stood out as an ideal partner. Second, Turkey boasts one of the strongest armies 
in the NATO while Qatar needs other countries for its security. Turkey, a strong 
NATO member with vast human resources and economic potential, represented 
a strong counter-balance to the increasing Iranian influence in the region, both 
politically and militarily (Dirioz, 2013; Guney, 2013). Although Qatar deems Iran 
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as an important neighbor; she does not want to see Tehran enhance its regional 
political influence even further as this could bolster Iran‟s irredentist views and 
jeopardize the North Field, Qatar‟s economic lifeline.  
 Due to security concerns stemming from Iran‟s bolstered regional 
influence and its alleged meddling in regional affairs, especially provoking the 
Shiite population in their territories, some of the GCC members, Bahrain and 
Kuwait, wanted Turkey to play a role in extending the NATO‟s security umbrella 
over the GCC. To this end, the GCC announced Turkey as a strategic ally in 
2008, which was wholeheartedly welcomed by Doha. In fact, on the occasion of 
the signing of the memorandum of understanding for accomplishing strategic 
partnership in all areas the Qatari Foreign Minister Hamad Bin Jassim stated that 
this "is a step on the way to a strategic partnership with Turkey” (“Gulf 
monarchies boost ties with Turkey”, 2008).  
 Moreover, in a Der Spiegel interview, the Emir stated that “China is 
coming, India is coming and Russia is on its way, too… I don‟t know if America 
and Europe will still be leading…” (Windfuhr & Zand, 2009). Taken in the context 
of a potential decreased role for the Americans in the Gulf security in the future 
and the potential threats from neighboring countries, i.e. Iran and Saudi Arabia, 
developing close relations with Turkey could be Emir‟s strategy to diversify 
political and military allies. Finally, according to Eckart Woertz, an expert on 
Middle East food security, one of the most pressing security issues for Doha is 
food security (personal contact, April 14, 2013). In this regards, Guney (2013) 
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maintains that Turkey stands out as a reliable and geographically convenient 
partner for Qatar to secure food for its growing population.  
3.2.4.2. Economic interests 
 Economy was probably the strongest motivation for the Turkish-Qatari 
relations, more so for Ankara. Although the relationship has gained a political 
alignment dimension throughout the Arab Spring, initially, the economic leg of 
this relationship was much stronger. For Ankara, Doha represents another 
lucrative Gulf market which can fuel the bustling Turkish economy. Trade 
volumes, tourism, FDIs and energy cooperation projects between Turkey and 
Qatar point to a gradually growing relationship. As Table 1 below shows, while 
the Turkish-Qatari trade volume was only around $20 million in 2000, it hit an all-
time record in 2008 reaching a staggering $1,233 billion. Although Turkey‟s 
exports to Qatar has dwindled due to the post-economic crisis environment, 
Qatari exports to Turkey have witnessed a steady increase reaching to almost 
half a billion USD in 2012. 
 Tourism has emerged as another area where both actors could gain 
economic benefits. Although, according to Turkey‟s Ministry of Culture and 
Tourism (2013), only 108 Qatari people visited Turkey in 2000, this figure has 
jumped to 1,210 in 2003, 1,955 people in 2005, 4,862 people in 2008, 7,661 
people in 2011, 13,971 people in 2012 and almost 20,000 in 2013. In a similar 
trajectory, Qatari and Turkish FDI figures have seen a surge. 
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Table 1 Turkish-Qatari Trade Volumes from 2000-2013 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Turkish Exports to Qatar 
            
9,963*  
           
8,402  
         
15,572  
          
15,688  
          
35,026  
          
82,045  
        
342,147  
Qatari Exports to Turkey 
          
11,313  
           
5,779  
         
10,659  
            
8,310  
          
17,727  
          
50,725  
          
66,411  
Year  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Turkish Exports to Qatar 
        
449,963  
   
1,074,013  
       
289,361
41
  
        
162,549  
        
188,138  
        
257,329  
        
244,077  
Qatari Exports to Turkey 
          
29,643  
       
159,353  
         
85,652  
        
177,046  
        
481,018  
        
466,499  
        
373,923  
Source: Turkish Statistical Institute, 2014 *million $ 
 
 According to Turkey‟s Ministry of Economy42, Turkish FDI stock in Qatar 
reached $14 million in 2012, construction being the leading sector, while Qatari 
FDI in Turkey reached $274 million in the same period. As of December 2013, 35 
Turkish companies such as TAV, Yuksel, TEKFEN, Nurol, Samko, STFA and 
Yapi Merkezi, were involved in 108 projects in Qatar, which exceeded $12.2 
billion in total (Doha Bank, 2013). Until 2013, Turkish construction companies 
were involved in the building of the Hamad International Airport, the Education 
City, the Qatar National Convention Center, the North Road, the Salwa Road, 
                                                 
41
 The dramatic decrease in Turkish exports in 2009 can be explained with the effects of global financial 
crisis on the Qatari construction sector, which heavily hit the Turkish steel and cement exports, two of the 
main export items. 
42
 For details see: 
http://www.economy.gov.tr/index.cfm?sayfa=countriesandregions&country=QA&region=4 
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Port developments in Mesaieed and Ras Laffan, pipelines and GTL and LNG 
terminals (Factsheet on Turkey-Qatar Trade and Economic Relations, 2010). 
 Both Ankara and Doha view each other as valuable assets for cooperation 
in energy. Turkey is an energy-hungry economy that imports billions of dollars‟ 
worth of natural gas while Qatar is one of the leading natural gas exporters. 
According to the US Energy Information Administration data, Turkey has been in 
the list of countries with the highest energy demand increase. For example, 
Turkey, which is reliant on natural gas for almost half of its electricity production, 
imported 1.6 tcf of natural gas in 201243, which puts it in the list of top natural gas 
consumers in Europe. In this sense, access to sufficient and predictable gas 
supplies is a very important economic security issue for Turkey. To this end, 
Ankara has persistently tried to lower its heavy dependence on the Russian and 
Iranian natural gas. With Qatar becoming an important natural gas exporter, 
there emerged new avenues of cooperation in energy (“Turkey accelerates 
efforts”, 2008).  
 Turkey‟s desire to become a major energy hub could be enhanced to a 
great extent if Qatari natural gas was transported to Turkey and then to the 
European markets via a pipeline. In this respect, in 2009, Qatar indicated interest 
in connecting to a projected pipeline that would run from Iran‟s South Pars Field 
to the Iranian mainland and onto Turkey (Babali, 2010). Such a pipeline would 
facilitate Turkey‟s goal to become an energy hub, increase economic 
                                                 
43
 Energy data on Turkey can be reached at: http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=tu  
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interdependence among neighbors and open Qatari gas to the European 
markets (Acikel, 2011). To this end, during his visit to Turkey in 2009, Sheikh 
Hamad and President Gul “…had an exhaustive discussion on the pipelines, 
storage facilities, and refineries to be established… [in addition to]... the supply of 
liquefied natural gas (LNG) from Qatar,” (Presidency of the Republic of Turkey, 
2009). 
  Mutual economic transactions were not confined to trade volumes, FDI 
and cooperation in energy. Turkey pursued an active policy to organize fairs and 
other organizations in order to increase the amount of Turkish exports to Qatar 
and augment Turkey‟s visibility in the Qatari market. For example, a “Made in 
Turkey Fair” was organized in 2009 whereby a wide selection of Turkish products 
and over 200 Turkish firms met the Qatari consumers. Organized by Istanbul 
Chamber of Commerce, the „Made in Turkey Exhibition‟ was the biggest Turkish 
products exhibition that has ever been organized abroad (Turkey Aims to Boost 
Trade with Qatar, 2009). These economic activities and the increasing visibility of 
Qatar, both internationally and in Turkey, attracted increasingly more Turkish 
people to Qatar, from small business owners to skilled workers to academics. 
This brought about plans to open a Turkish School in Doha as well as a Turkish 
Language Center. 
 Such close economic relations was hailed by both governments but also 
regarded as not satisfactory given the level of political relations. For example, in 
a seminar held after the first meeting of the Turkish-Qatari Business Council 
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(TQBC) in Istanbul in 2013, Sheikh Faisal bin Qassim, chairman of the Qatari 
Businessmen Association (QBA), stated that the QBA wants to enhance 
economic relations to the level of political relations (“Qatar, Turkey explore 
business opportunities”, 2013). To bring economic relations to the level of 
political relations, both the Qatari government, including the QBA, and the 
Turkish government advocated for Turkish companies to win as many contracts 
as possible as part of the 2022 World Cup investments.  
 For Doha, Turkey has stood out as a potentially lucrative market not only 
for natural gas exports but also for investments in multiple areas. Investments in 
different sectors expedited after the TQBC, whose aim is to enhance trade 
volume between the two countries, was formed in 2006. In the TQBC meeting 
held in Istanbul in 2009, chairman for Union of Chambers' and Commodity 
Exchanges of Turkey, Hisarciklioglu stated that "There are many opportunities 
that will strengthen the cooperation between Turkey and Qatar. Turkey is a land 
of opportunities in terms of investments" (“Turkish-Qatari Business Council 
Meeting”, 2009). Similarly, Mubarak Al Shafi, Qatari ambassador to Ankara, 
stated that “We see Turkey as a very efficient country in terms of investment. 
There are many opportunities for Qatari investors in the energy, transportation, 
tourism and real estate sectors.” (Unal, 2014).  
 Within this framework, Al Wasaeel International Media Company, a 
subsidiary of the Qatar Investment Authority (QIA), bought 25% share of the 
Turkish  Turkuvaz Medya in 2008. The Barwa Group, one of the Qatari real 
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estate giants, partnered with the Turkish construction company Sinpas in 2011 to 
build the Ottoman Suites seaside residences in Istanbul. In 2012, Barwa group 
announced a $500 million real estate investment project, from which Turkey was 
to get a considerable amount. Barwa‟s CEO Abdullah Abdulaziz Al Subaie stated 
that “Barwa Group plans to invest in residence and shopping mall projects in 
Turkey. Turkey‟s growing economy and promising real estate market is an 
investor magnet.” (“Qatari real estate developer to expand in Turkey” 2013). 
Similarly, in 2011, Hassad Food, another subsidiary of the QIA, announced plans 
to buy farmland in Turkey to grow crops and raise livestock.  
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CHAPTER IV: Conclusion 
 Turkey‟s relationship with the Gulf Arab countries has evolved quite 
parallel to its relations with the Arab countries in the larger Middle East. Foreign 
policy orientations of Turkey and the Gulf countries, the trajectory of Turkey‟s 
relations with Israel, economic considerations as well as security concerns were 
important factors that shaped Turkey-Gulf Arab relations until 2002. Relations 
between Turkey and the GCC have witnessed unprecedented improvement from 
2002 onwards, with the coming to power of the JDP. The Turkish Parliament‟s 
position vis-à-vis the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the convergence of 
opinion on security issues stemming from the sectarian frictions in Iraq prepared 
the ground for better Turkey-Gulf relations. Also, the threat of radical terrorism, 
the increasing Iranian influence in the region and Turkey‟s decisive pursuance of 
the EU membership were other dynamics that boosted GCC-Turkey relations in 
this period.  
  The dynamics above were also instrumental in shaping Turkish-Qatari 
relations given the fact that Qatar is a GCC member. In addition, there were 
other dynamics that facilitated closer Turkish-Qatari relations. Having similar 
foreign policy visions and utilizing similar tools to realize their visions, Ankara and 
Doha experienced a wide array of political convergences on crucial Middle 
Eastern and Gulf Arab issues such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the 
Lebanese sectarian frictions, Iran‟s nuclear program and the Arab Spring. More 
108 
 
specifically, Turkey and Qatar enjoyed similar positions on the increasing 
influence of Islamists, i.e. the MB, throughout the Arab Spring. This was 
instrumental in their close political coordination throughout the Egyptian and the 
Syrian uprisings and the subsequent conflicts in these countries. 
 The turmoil unleashed by the Arab Spring expanded this political 
alignment and increased venues for cooperation between Turkey and Qatar. As 
a new geostrategic reality was taking root and the regional order was 
disintegrating, relations between Ankara and Doha reached remarkable levels. 
However, this came at the expense of neighborly relations with the other regional 
political actors. Although the democratically elected MB governments seemed to 
provide opportunities for Turkey and Qatar to expand their influence in the 
region, the Saudi-Emirati axis reversed the popular revolutions with counter-
revolutions, as was the case in Egypt. For the Saudis and the Emiratis, the 
democratically elected MB governments posed an ontological threat to their 
survival. Similarly, Turkey‟s relations with neighboring Iran and Iraq, not to 
mention Syria, have worsened due to increasing sectarian nature of Turkish 
foreign policy. 
 On the domestic level, an increasingly multidimensional and less-security 
oriented foreign policy of both actors paved the way for close relations between 
Ankara and Doha. The unprecedented economic development both actors 
realized equipped Ankara and Doha with the financial means to pursue their 
ambitious policies. In addition, the leadership and their similar outlook on identity 
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politics, i.e. their firm support for the rising power of Islamists, expedited these 
relations. Finally and most importantly, pursuing a predominantly pragmatic 
rather than purely ideology-oriented foreign policy, both actors had a wide range 
of political, strategic and economic interests in establishing close relations, which 
transformed relations into political alignment, particularly throughout the Arab 
Spring. 
 In summation, the dynamics that motivated closer Turkey-Gulf relations 
demonstrate continuity. Security issues (Israeli-Palestinian conflict, sectarian 
conflict in Iraq, increasing Iranian influence, Iranian nuclear program) and 
economic concerns (need for markets, need for FDI) have shaped relations over 
the years. At some periods security-oriented policies dominated the relations, 
while during other periods economic motivations dominated. Additionally, 
ideational factors, such as the historical ties and socio-cultural affinities between 
Turkey and its Gulf Arab counterparts have sometimes facilitated the relations as 
well as caused confusion and suspicion on the Arab side, especially when the 
Turkish side approached Israel or seemed to support the Western position on 
regional issues.  
 Comparable to the dynamics above, the evolution of the Turkish-Qatari 
relations from 2002 until 2013 were shaped predominantly by security concerns, 
pragmatic foreign policy approaches and economic and political interests. 
Additionally, ideational factors such as identity of decision-makers in the higher 
echelons of the state apparatus seems to have facilitated the abovementioned 
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political alignment between Ankara and Doha. In this regard, the current study 
validates the mostly disparate body of literature on Turkish-Qatari relations from 
2002 to 2013 and points to a considerable degree of exceptionalism and 
detachedness the Turkish-Qatari relationship has demonstrated throughout the 
Arab Spring, compared to the trajectory of relations with other actors in the 
Middle East in general and the Gulf in particular. In this regard, one of the 
questions that future research can into is how possible it is for the GCC as an 
institution to establish a unified relationship with Turkey.  
 This study does not claim that there are unique reasons behind 
exceptionally closer relations between Turkey and Qatar within the specified 
period. Rather, the dynamics that shaped relations between Turkey and the Gulf 
Arab countries on the one hand and the dynamics that shaped relations between 
Turkey and Qatar on the other have been quite similar. This proposition is 
corroborated by the survey of the literature on the relations between Ankara and 
Doha and the data collected through interviews. In fact, these dynamics seemed 
to be identical until the Arab Spring surfaced deep seated concerns some GCC 
member states have regarding their regime survival. In this respect, what seems 
to have differentiated the Turkish-Qatari position, compared to some of the other 
Gulf countries, most notably Saudi Arabia and the UAE, is their stance on the 
Islamists and the Islamists' potential effect on the political status quo of the 
region. Future research could look into the specific reasons that made relations 
between the two actors exceptionally close.  
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 How sustainable is the current level of the TR-QR relations? Whether or 
not the current trajectory of Turkey-Qatar relations is sustainable over the coming 
years is contingent upon a multitude of domestic and regional dynamics. Will the 
JDP party continue to be the dominant power in Turkish politics? What does the 
Islamic State mean for the regional political arena afflicted by sectarian conflict? 
How would potential economic problems in both or either of the countries affect 
relations? How will the MB elements react to increasing levels of state repression 
in the Arab Spring countries, especially Egypt? What direction will the friction 
between Qatar and its Gulf neighbors take? Given Turkey‟s and Qatar‟s political, 
strategic and economic interests and their need for regional allies in an unstable 
Middle East, it may not be far-fetched to anticipate that the relations will, at least, 
maintain its current level, if not intensify even further.  
  
112 
 
References 
Abdulla, A. (2010). Contemporary Socio-Political Issues of the Arab Gulf 
Moment. Kuwait Programme on Development, Governance and 
Globalisation in the Gulf States, Research Paper No. 11. London: London 
School of Economics. 
Ahmed, N. (2013, August 30). Syria intervention plan fueled by oil interests, not 
chemical weapon concern. The Guardian. Retrieved from 
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/earth-insight/2013/aug/30/syria-
chemical-attack-war-intervention-oil-gas-energy-pipelines on June 1, 
2014.  
Aktas, G. Y. (2010). Turkish Foreign Policy: New Concepts and Reflections. 
Middle East Technical University: Ankara. 
Altunisik, M. B. (2008). The Possibilities and Limits of Turkey‟s Soft Power in the 
Middle East. Insight Turkey, 10(2), 41–54. 
Altunisik, M. B. (2013). Turkey-Syria Relations: Between Enmity and Amity. In R. 
Hinnebusch & O. Tur (Eds.), Turkey-Syria relations: between enmity and 
amity (pp. 177–191). Farnham, Surrey, England Burlington: Ashgate. 
Altunisik, M. B., & Tur, O. (2005). Turkey: Challenges of Continuity and Change. 
London; New York: Routledge. 
113 
 
Aras, B. (2005). Turkey and the GCC: An Emerging Relationship. Middle East 
Policy, 12(4), 89–97. 
Aras, B. (2009). The Davutoglu Era in Turkish Foreign Policy. Insight Turkey, 
11(3), 127–142. 
Arab world favors Turkey, sees as model, study reveals. (2010, May, 18). 
Today‟s Zaman. Retrieved from http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-
web/news-210462-arab-world-favors-turkey-sees-as-model-study-
reveals.html on April 2, 2014.   
Assad, Erdogan and Sheikh Hamad meet in Istanbul (May 9, 2010) Syrian News 
Station. Retrieved from http://sns.sy/sns/?path=/news/read/13858 on June 
1, 2014.  
Ataman, M. & Ucgan, N. (2011). Türkiye‟nin Körfez Ülkeleri, Yemen, Mısır, Ürdün 
ve Lübnan Politikası (Turkey‟s Foreign Policy Towards the Gulf, Yemen, 
Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon). Türk Dış Politikası Yıllığı 2009, Ankara: 
SETA Publications, pp.189-222. 
Ayhan, V. (2011). Başbakan Erdoğan‟ın Kuveyt ve Katar Ziyaretleri. Middle East 
Strategic Research Center ORSAM. Retrieved from 
http://www.orsam.org.tr/tr/yazigoster.aspx?ID=1378 on April 8, 2014.  
114 
 
Ayhan, V. (2009). Türkiye-Körfez İşbirliği Konseyi İlişkilerinde Yeni Bir Dönem: 
Yüksek Düzeyli Stratejik Diyalog (A New Phase in Turkey-GCC Relations: 
High Level Strategic Dialog). Ortadogu Analiz, 1(7-8), 114–123.  
Aykan, M. B. (1994). Türkiye‟nin Basra Körfezi Güvenliği Politikası: 1979-1988 
(Turkey‟s Persian Gulf Security Policies). ODTÜ Gelişim Dergisi, 21 (1), 
23- 58. 
Barakat, S. (2012). The Qatari Spring: Qatar‟s emerging role in peacemaking. 
Kuwait Program on Development. Retrieved from 
http://www2.lse.ac.uk/government/research/resgroups/kuwait/documents/
The-Qatari-Spring - Qatars-Emerging-Role-in-Peacemaking.pdf on August 
2, 2014.  
Barkey, H. J. (2011). Turkish Foreign Policy and the Middle East. SciencesPo 
CERI Strategy Papers (No. 10). 
Baskan, B. (2011a). Ankara Torn Apart: Arab Spring Turns into Turkey‟s Autumn. 
The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations, 42, 1–25. 
Baskan, B. (2011b). Turkey-GCC Relations: Is There a Future? Insight Turkey, 
13(1), 159–173. 
Bayoumi, A. (2014a). Qatari-Turkish Relations, A Model To Apply. Al-Watan. 
Retrieved from http://www.al-watan.com/viewnews.aspx?n=3F642A16-
115 
 
78E5-48AE-B8F7-F4E8C3A00033&d=20140215 on May 14, 2014.  
Bayoumi, A. (2014b). Qatari-Turkish relations serve the security and stability of 
the region. Al-Watan. Retrieved from http://www.al-
watan.com/viewnews.aspx?d=20140304&cat=statenews1&pge=6 on May 
28, 2014. 
Bengio, O. & Özcan, G. (2000). „Changing Relations: Turkish–Israeli–Arab 
Triangle. Perceptions 5(1): 134–146.  
Beaumont, P. (2012, July). How Qatar is taking on the world. The Observer, 1–
13. 
Bollier, S. (26 June, 2013). Can Qatar replace its renaissance man? Al-Jazeera. 
Retrieved from 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/06/201362613431469150
.html  on March 12, 2014. 
Bradley. M. (2012, September 15). Turkey to Provide Egypt $2 Billion in Aid. Wall 
Street Journal. Retrieved from 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10000872396390444517304577653
852418813354 on June 18, 2014. 
Carkoglu, A. & Eder, M. (2001) Domestic Concerns and the Water Conflict over 
the Euphrates–Tigris River Basin. Middle Eastern Studies 37(1), 41–71 . 
116 
 
Cetinoglu, A. N. (2009). 11 Eylül 2001 Sonrasi Türkiye-Körfez Isbirligi Iliskileri. 
Akademik Ortadogu, 4(1), 143–171. 
Cevik, S. (2013, December 11). Turkey‟s Humanitarian Assistance: The Fourth 
Largest Donor State. USC Center on Public Diplomacy. Retrieved from 
http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/blog/turkey%E2%80%99s-humanitarian-
assistance-fourth-largest-donor-state on June 23, 2014.  
Cevikalp, M. (2013, March). Küçük dev, yeni aktör: Katar. Aksiyon. Retrieved 
from 
http://www.aksiyon.com.tr/aksiyon/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?newsI
d=35093 on July 1, 2014.    
Cooper, A. & Momani. B. (2009). The Challenge of Re-Branding Progressive 
Countries in the Gulf and Middle East: Opportunities through New 
Networked Engagements versus Constraints of Embedded Negative 
Images. Place Branding and Public Diplomacy, 5 (2), pp. 103–17. 
Constitution of the State of Qatar 2004. Retrieved from 
http://portal.www.gov.qa/wps/wcm/connect/5a5512804665e3afa54fb5fd2b
4ab27a/Constitution+of+Qatar+EN.pdf?MOD=AJPERES  on May 23, 
2014. 
Dalay, G., & Friedman, D. (2013). The AK Party and the Evolution of Turkish 
Political Islam‟s Foreign Policy. Insight Turkey, 15(2), 123–139. 
117 
 
Danforth, N. (2010). Ideology and Pragmatism in Turkish Foreign Policy: from 
Atatürk to the AKP. Turkish Policy Quarterly 7(3). pp. 83-95. 
Davutoglu, A. (2010). Stratejik derinlik: Türkiye'nin uluslararası konumu. 
(Strategic Depth: Turkey‟s International Position) Aksaray, İstanbul: Vefa 
Yayınlar. 
Demir, Y. (2009). 1960-1980 Dönemi Türk-Arap Ekonomik İlişkileri (1960-1980 
Turkish-Arab Econonomic Relations). Cagdas Türkiye Tarihi Arastirmalari 
Dergisi, 8(18-19), 209–227. 
Dirioz, A. O. (2009). Katar‟in Çok Yönlü Diş Politikasi. (The Multidirectional 
Foreign Policy of Qatar). Ortadogu Analiz, 1(3), 61–67. 
Dirioz, A. O. (2013). Beş Yılın Ardından Türkiye - Körfez İşbirliği Konseyi (KİK) 
Stratejik Ortaklığı. (Turkey and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
Strategic Partnership After Five Years). Ortadogu Analiz, 5(55), 71–78. 
Egypt Returns $2 Billion to Qatar in Sign of Growing Tensions, (2013, September 
19). Voice of America. Retrieved from 
http://www.voanews.com/articleprintview/1753280.html on April 2, 2014.  
Ekmekci, F., & Yildirim, A. (2013). The Political Economy of Turkey‟s Eastern 
Turn: An Empirical Analysis of Erdogan's state Visits (2003-2010). 
Romanian Journal of Political Science, 13(1), 52–75. 
118 
 
Erkacar M. E. & Karagol, E. T. (2011) Türkiye‟ de Doğrudan Yabancı Yatırımlar. 
SETA Analiz. Issue. 33. 
Factsheet on Turkey-Qatar Trade and Economic Relations, (2010). Office of the 
Commercial Counselor, The Republic of Turkey. Retrieved from 
http://www.musavirlikler.gov.tr/upload/QA/Bilgi%20Notlari/TR-
KAT%20ikili%20iliskiler.pdf  on June 27, 2014.  
Firat, M. & Kurkcuoglu, O. (2001a). 1960-1980 Arap Ülkeleriyle İlişkiler (1960-
1980 Relations with Arab countries) in Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş 
Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar (Turkish Foreign Policy: 
Events, Documents, Analysis Since the War of Independence). Ed. 
Baskın Oran, İstanbul, İletişim Yayınları, pp. 785-796. 
Firat, M. & Kurkcuoglu, O. (2001b). 1980-1990 Arap Ülkeleriyle İlişkiler (1980-
1990 Relations with Arab Countries) in Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş 
Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar (Turkish Foreign Policy: 
Events, Documents, Analysis Since the War of Independence). Ed. 
Baskın Oran, İstanbul, İletişim Yayınları, pp. 124-149. 
FM Pledges Qatar‟s Support for Alliance of Civilisations (2014, May 14). Gulf 
Times. Retrieved from http://www.gulf-
times.com/Mobile/Qatar/178/details/393479/FM-pledges-
Qatar%E2%80%99s-support-for-Alliance-of-Civilisations on July 2, 2014.  
119 
 
Global Humanitarian Assistance Report (2013). The Global Humanitarian 
Assistance. Retrieved from 
http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/07/GHA-Report-2013.pdf on May 29, 2014.  
Gonlubol, M. & Kurkcuoglu, O. (2006). Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası: 1919-1995. 
Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi. 
Gulf monarchies boost ties with Turkey (2008, April 9). Reuters. Retrieved from 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=gulf-
monarchies-boost-ties-with-turkey-2008-09-04 on May 17, 2014. 
Gumus, B. (2013). Türkiye-Katar İlişkileri USGAM. Retrieved from 
http://www.usgam.com/tr/index.php?l=807&cid=2112&konu=0&bolge=5 
on March 12, 2014.  
Guney, H. (2013, January 29). Analiz: Türkiye Katar ilişkileri Stratejik Ortak. 
Aktuel. Retrieved from 
http://www.aktuel.com.tr/Gundem/2013/01/29/analiz-turkiye-katar-iliskileri 
on March 15, 2014. 
Hale, W. (2013). Turkish foreign policy since 1774. New York, NY: Routledge. 
Hale, W. (1988). Transition to Civilian Governments in Turkey: The Military 
Perspective, in Heper. M. & Evin, A. (eds.), State, Democracy and the 
120 
 
Military, Turkey in the 1980s, Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, p. 
166. 
Hamad bin Jassim bin Jaber al-Thani (2012, April 18) The World's 100 Most 
Influential People: 2012. Time. Retrieved from 
http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,2111975_2
111976_2112001,00.html on June 4, 2014.  
Hanieh, A. (2010). Khaleeji-Capital: Class-Formation and Regional Integration in 
the Middle-East Gulf. Historical Materialism, 18(2), 35–76. 
doi:10.1163/156920610X512435.  
Hudson, V. (2005). Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the 
Ground of International Relations. Foreign Policy Analysis, 1(1), pp. 1-30. 
Ilgit A. & Davis, R. (2013). The Many Roles of Turkey in the Syrian Crisis. The 
Middle East Research and Information Project. Retrieved from 
http://www.merip.org/mero/mero012813?ip_login_no_cache=5977671237
0280d071d1a11ad84c3239 on June 21, 2014.  
Ismael, T. Y., & Aydin, M. (2003). Turkey‟s Foreign Policy in the 21st Century: A 
Changing Role in World Politics. Aldershot; Hants; England Burlington: 
VT: Ashgate. 
Kamel, A. (1974). Türkiye'nin Arap Dünyasiyla  Iliskileri. Ankara, Dis Politika, 4:4, 
pp.5-20.  
121 
 
Kamrava, M. (2011). Mediation and Qatari Foreign policy. The Middle East 
Journal, 65(4), 539–556. doi:10.3751/65.4.11 
Kamrava, M. (2013). Qatar : small state, big politics. Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press. 
Kanat, R. A. (2010). AK Party‟s Foreign Policy: Is Turkey Turning Away from the 
West? Insight Turkey, 12(1), 205–225. 
Karadeli, C. (2007). Ortadoğu‟ya Yönelik Türk Dis Politikasinda Kirilmalar Ve 
Yenilikler. (Turkey‟s Foreign Policy Towards The Middle East: Change 
And Continuity) Akademik Ortadogu, 2(1), 35–48. 
Kardas, S. (2012). Turkey and the Gulf Dialogue in the Middle East. Istanbul. 
Retrieved from http://www.tesev.org.tr/assets/publications/file/Turkey and 
Gulf Dialogue_Saban Kardas.pdf on April 23, 2014.  
Kardas, S. (2006). “Turkey and the Iraqi Crisis: JDP Between Identity and 
Interest”. In The Emergence of a New Turkey: Democracy and the AK 
Parti, edited by M. Hakan Yavuz. Salt Lake City, UT: The University of 
Utah Press. 
Karpat, K. H. (2001). Ortadoğu‟da Osmanlı Mirası ve Ulusçuluk (The Ottoman 
Heritage in the Middle East and Nationalism). Ankara, İmge Kitabevi. 
Khatib, L. (2013). Qatar‟s foreign policy: the limits of pragmatism. International 
Affairs, 89(2), 417–431. 
122 
 
Kirisci, K. (2001). The Future of Turkish Policy Toward the Middle East. In B. 
Rubin & K. Kirisci (Eds.), Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging 
Multidimensional Power. Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
Kirisci, K. (2009). The transformation of Turkish foreign policy : The rise of the 
trading state. New Perspective On Turkey, 40, pp. 29–57. 
Kocgunduz, L. M. (2011). Basra Korfezi‟nin Parlayan Incisi: Katar. Ortadogu 
Analiz, 3(26), 71–81. 
Koni, H. (2012). Saudi Influence on Islamic Institutions in Turkey Beginning in the 
1970s. Middle East Journal, 66(1), 97–110. 
Laciner, S. (2009). Turgut Özal Period in Turkish Foreign Policy : Özalism. USAK 
Yearbook of International Politics and Law (2), 153–205. Retrieved from 
http://www.turkishweekly.net/article/333/turgut-ozal-period-in-turkish-
foreign-policy-ozalism.html on April 25, 2014.  
Legrenzi, M. (2007). NATO in the Gulf: Who Is Doing Whom A Favor? Middle 
East Policy, 14(1), 69-70. doi:10.1111/j.1475-4967.2007.00283.x.  
Marshall C. & Rossman, G.(2006). Designing qualitative research. Sage 
Publications, Thousand Oaks. 
Mercan, M. H. (2008). 1964-1984 Arası Türkiye ve ABD‟nin Basra Körfezi‟ne 
Yönelik Güvenlik Politikaları (Turkish and American Arabian Gulf Security 
Policies from 1964 to 1984). ILEM Yillik, 3(3), 133–151. 
123 
 
Ministry of Culture and Tourism (2013). Number of Tourists Visiting Turkey. 
Retrieved from   http://www.ktbyatirimisletmeler.gov.tr/TR,9854/sinir-giris-
cikis-istatistikleri.html on June 21, 2014.  
Momani, B., & Ennis, C. (2012). Between caution and controversy: lessons from 
the Gulf Arab states as (re-)emerging donors. Cambridge Review of 
International Affairs, 25(4), 605–627. doi:10.1080/09557571.2012.734786.  
Oguzlu, T. (2007). Soft power in Turkish foreign policy. Australian Journal of 
International Affairs, 61(1), 81–97. doi:10.1080/10357710601142518 
Oktav, O. Z. (2013). Arap Baharı ve Türkiye-Körfez Devletleri İlişkileri (Arab 
Spring and Turkey-Gulf Relations). Ortadogu Analiz, 5(51), 69–78. 
Oktav, O. Z. (2011). Turkey in the 21st century quest for a new foreign policy. 
Farnham, Surrey Burlington, VT: Ashgate. 
Olson, R. (2008). Turkey‟s Relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council from 
2003 to 2007: New Paradigms? Mediterranean Quarterly, 19(3), 68–87. 
doi:10.1215/10474552-2008-014.  
Ozbudun, E. (2000). Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic 
Consolidation, London: Lynne Rienner. pp. 73–105. 
Ozcan, M. (2008). Harmonizing Foreign Policy: Turkey, the EU and the Middle 
East. Burlington: VT: Ashgate. 
124 
 
Ozel, S. (1995). Of Not Being a Lone Wolf: Geography, Domestic Plays, and 
Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East, in Geoffrey K. & Janice G. S. 
(eds), The Powder Keg in the Middle East: The Struggle for Gulf Security. 
Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 
Ozel, S. (2009, December, 8). Divining Davutoglu: Turkey's Foreign Policy Under 
New Leadership. The Globalist. Retrieved from 
http://www.theglobalist.com/divining-davutoglu-turkeys-foreign-policy-
under-new-leadership/ on June 5, 2014. 
Ozturk, T. E. (2011). Ortadoğu‟daki Son Gelişmeler ve Türkiye-Katar İlişkileri: 
Yeni Bir Sünni Bloğu Mu? (The Latest Developments in the Middle East 
and Turkey-Qatar Relations: A New Sunni Block?) Türk Asya Stratejik 
Araştırmalar Merkezi TASAM.  
Patton, M. Q. (2002). Qualitative research and evaluation methods. Sage 
Publications, Thousand Oaks.  
Peterson, J.E. (2006). Qatar and the World: Branding for a Micro-State. Middle 
East Journal, (60) 4. p732-748. 
Philbrick, I., & Shepherd, H. (2013). Qatar‟s Big Ambitions: An Interview with Dr. 
Mehran Kamrava. Georgetown Journal of International Affairs.  
125 
 
Presidency of the Republic of Turkey (2009). Turkey and Qatar: Perfect accord in 
every field. Retrieved from http://www.tccb.gov.tr/news/397/48111/turkey-
and-qatar-perfect-accord-in-every-field.html on April 4, 2013. 
Qatari real estate developer to expand in Turkey, (2013, June, 6). Invest in 
Turkey. Retrieved from http://www.invest.gov.tr/en-
us/infocenter/news/Pages/060613-qatari-barwa-investing-in-turkey-real-
estates.aspx on June 17, 2014.  
Qatar, Turkey explore business opportunities, (2013, March 18). Gulf News. 
Retrieved from http://www.gulf-times.com/qatar/178/details/345905/qatar,-
turkey-explore-business-opportunities on June 5, 2014.  
Qatar-Turkey Relations: Political and Economic Rapprochement (2014, February 
15). (داصتقلااو ةسايسلا يف براقت :ةيكرتلا - ةيررقلا  اقلاعلا) The New Araby. Retrieved 
from http://www.alaraby.co.uk/politics/a7af7911-3294-416f-8de5-
8d7360cf5e64 on April 23, 2014.  
Raptopoulos, N. (2004). Rediscovering its Arab neighbours? The AKP imprint on 
Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East. Les Cahiers Du RMES (1), pp. 
1–13. 
Roberts, D. B. (2012). Understanding Qatar‟s Foreign Policy Objectives. 
Mediterranean Politics, 17(2), 233–239. Retrieved from 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2012.695123  
126 
 
Robins, P. (2003). Suits and uniforms: Turkish foreign policy since the Cold War. 
Seattle, Wash: University of Washington Press.  
Robins, P. (1991). Turkey and the Middle East, London: Pinter Publishers Ltd.  
Samaan, J.-L. (2013). The rise and fall of the “Turkish Model” in the Arab world. 
Turkish Policy Quarterly, 12(3), 61–69.  
Salem, P., & Zeeuw, H. D. (2012). Qatari Foreign Policy : The Changing 
Dynamics of an Outsize Role. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
pp. 1–4. Retrieved from http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/12/31/russia-
and-west-need-to-rediscover-each-other-in-2013/fi3k on April 21, 2014.  
Sayari, S. (1996). “Political Parties, Party Systems, and Economic Reforms: the 
Turkish Case” Studies in Comparative International Development, 34(4), 
pp. 29–45.  
Schatzman, L. & Strauss, A. (1973). Field research; strategies for a natural 
sociology, Englewood Cliff, Prentice Hall.  
Scheffer, J de H. (2005) NATO‟s role in Gulf security. Retirieved from: 
http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2005/s051201a.htm on March 15, 2014.  
Simsek S. (2013, July 8). Mısır‟daki darbe Şii blokunu güçlendirdi (The Military 
Coup in Egypt Strengthened the Shia Block). Bugun Gazetesi. Retrieved 
127 
 
from http://dunya.bugun.com.tr/elleri-cok-guclendi-haberi/709513 on April 
21, 2014.  
Smolen, K. (2012). Soft power in Turkey's foreign policy towards the Middle East 
region. Annales UMCS, (18)1, 67–87. DOI:10.2478/v10226-011-0005-3.  
Soysal, I. (2000). Yakın Tarihin Işığında Türk-Arap İlişkileri: 1970-1980 (Turkish-
Arab Relations in Light of Recent History: 1970-1980 in İki Tarafın Bakış 
Açısından Türk- Arap Münasebetleri (Turkish-Arab Relations from Both 
Sides‟ Perspectives). İstanbul, İslam Tarih, Sanat ve Kültür Araştırma 
Merkezi, (IRCICA). 
Sozen, A. (2010). A Paradigm Shift in Turkish Foreign Policy: Transition and 
Challenges. Turkish Studies. 11(1), p.103-123. 
Steinberg, G. (2012). Qatar and the Arab Spring, (February), 1–8. Retrieved from 
http://www.swp-
berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2012C07_sbg.pdf on 
June 18, 2014.  
Taspinar, O. (2008). Turkey‟s Middle East Policies Between Neo-Ottomanism 
and Kemalism. Carnegie Papers: Carnegie Middle East Center Number 
10. 
Talbot, V. (2013). Turkey-GCC Relations in a Transforming Middle East. Middle 
East Review of International Affairs, (14), pp. 1–10). 
128 
 
Telhami, S. (2013, June 26). Behind the abdication of Qatar‟s emir. Reuters. 
Retrieved from http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2013/06/26/behind-
the-abdication-of-qatars-emir/ on June 7, 2014. 
Tocci, N. (2011). Turkey and the Arab Spring: Implications for Turkish Foreign 
Policy in Transatlantic Perspective, Washington, DC: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace. 
Traub, J. (2011, January 20). Turkey‟s Rules. New York Times. Retrieved from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/23/magazine/23davutoglu-
t.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 on June 16, 2014.  
Turkey Accelerates Efforts for LNG Purchase from Qatar (2008, April 15). 
Today‟s Zaman. Retrieved from 
http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail.action;jsessionid=uvMevEuXF8x
zLN6jzzfHSwVA?newsId=139040&columnistId=0 on April 16, 2014. 
Turkish-Qatari Business Council Meeting held in İstanbul, (2009, August 18). 
Today‟s Zaman. Retrieved from http://www.todayszaman.com/news-
184357-turkish-qatari-business-council-meeting-held-in-istanbul.html on 
May 16, 2014. 
Turkey-Qatar Relations (2011). Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
Retrieved from http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey-qatar-relations.en.mfa on May 
23, 2014.  
129 
 
Türkiye-Suudi Arabistan ikili ilişkileri: Siyasi ve Kültürel. (Turkey-Saudi Arabia 
Bilateral Relations: Political and Cultural) (2008, September 14). Turkish 
Embassy in Riyadh. Retrieved from 
http://riyad.be.mfa.gov.tr/ShowInfoNotes.aspx?ID=121158 on April 6, 
2014.  
Unal, A. (May 8, 2014). Turkey, Qatar Have Constructive Influence In Region, 
Says Envoy. Daily Sabah. Retrieved from 
http://www.dailysabah.com/politics/2014/05/09/turkey-qatar-have-
constructive-influence-in-region-says-envoy on May 15, 2014. 
UN Resolution 1696 (2006). Security Council Demands Iran Suspend Uranium 
Enrichment By 31 August, or Face Possible Economic, Diplomatic 
Sanctions. Retrieved from  
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8792.doc.htm on May 25, 
2014.  
Uslu, E. (2009). Ahmet Davutoglu: The Man behind Turkey's Assertive Foreign 
Policy. Eurasia Daily Monitor. 6(57). Retrieved from 
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=34754#.U6
9Z6pSSz1Y on June 6, 2014.  
Uzer, U., & Uzer, A. (2005). Diverging Perceptions of the Cold War: Baghdad 
Pact as a Source of Conflict Between Turkey and the Nationalist Arab 
Countries. Turkish Yearbook of International Relations, (36), 73–100.  
130 
 
Walker, J. W. (2007). Learning Strategic Depth: Implications of Turkey‟s New 
Foreign Policy Doctrine. Insight Turkey, 9(3), 32–47.  
Widen, E. (2012, December). Turkey and Qatar: A fruitful relationship. The Edge. 
Retrieved from http://www.theedge.me/turkey-and-qatar-a-fruitful-
relationship on March 3, 2014.  
Windfuhr, V. & Zand, B. (2009, March 29). Der Spiegel. Retrieved from 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/spiegel-interview-with-the-emir-
of-qatar-we-are-coming-to-invest-a-616130-2.html on June 12, 2014.  
World Bank, World Development Indicators (2014). GDP growth (annual %), 
Qatar. Retrieved from 
http://api.worldbank.org/v2/en/indicator/ny.gdp.mktp.kd.zg?downloadforma
t=excel on June 21, 2014.  
Yavuz, H. M., & Khan, M. R. (1992). Turkish foreign policy toward the Arab-
Israeli conflict: Duality and the development (1950-1991). Arab Studies 
Quarterly, 14(4), 69. 
Yavuz, H. M. (1997) Turkish–Israeli: relations through the lens of the Turkish 
identity debate, Journal of Palestine Studies, 27(1), pp. 22–37. 
Yavuz, H. M. (2009). Secularism and Muslim democracy in Turkey. Cambridge, 
UK New York: Cambridge University Press. 
  
A 
 
Appendix 
Appendix A: Interview Questions 
  
MA INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
MA Title: The Evolution of the Turkish-Qatari Relations from 2002 to 2013: Economic 
Interests, Political Aspirations and Identities  
Main Research Question: How did the Turkish-Qatari relations evolve from 2002 to 
2013? 
I. Domestic dynamics  
1. What domestic events shaped the Turkish-Qatari relations in this period? 
2. What was the role of leadership in the evolution of the Turkish-Qatari 
relations in this period? 
3. What was the role of identity politics in the Turkish-Qatari relations in this 
period?  
i. To what extent do you think Turkish and Qatari leadership pursue 
identity politics in their foreign policy?  
4. What was the role of public perceptions in the Turkish-Qatari relations in 
this period? To what extent is public perceptions is a driver of Turkish-Qatari 
relations? 
5. What was the role of interests in the Turkish-Qatari relations in this period?  
i. Political interests 
ii. Strategic interests  
iii. Economic interests 
II. External dynamics  
1. What regional dynamics/events affected the Turkish-Qatari relations in this 
period? 
2. What global dynamics/events affected the Turkish-Qatari relations in this 
period? 
III. Arab Spring  
1. Some scholars suggest that the Turkish-Qatari political relations transformed 
into a political alignment since the onset of the Arab Spring. Do you agree 
or disagree? 
i. If you disagreed, could you please explain why?  
ii. If you agreed, what factors motivated this alignment? 
a. What domestic dynamics motivated the Turkish-Qatari 
political alignment throughout the Arab Spring? 
i. What was the role of Turkey’s and Qatar’s support 
for Muslim Brotherhood in the evolution of the 
political alignment in this period?  
b. What external dynamics motivated the Turkish-Qatari 
political alignment throughout the Arab Spring? 
2. What has the Arab Spring political alignment brought to Turkish-Qatari 
relations?  
IV. What are the prospects of Turkish-Qatari political alignment? Is it 
sustainable? 
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Appendix B: Cultural Cooperation Agreement Between the Governments of 
The Republic of Turkey and the Government of the State of Qatar, 1985 
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Appendix C: Protocol on Consultation Between the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the Republic of Turkey and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
State of Qatar, 1999 
  
Protocol on Consultation Between the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the Republic of Turkey and the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the State of Qatar
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey and the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs of the State of Qatar (hereinafter referred to as the
"Parties");
INSPIRED by the desire to increase and further consolidate existing ties
between the Parties;
REFLECTING the common aspiration of the Parties to develop friendship
and cooperation;
AFFIRMING their conviction that the furthering of the friendly relations
and cooperation between the Parties will contribute to international peace,
security and economic development by means of creating mutual confidence,
understanding and cooperation in international relations;
Have Agreed As Follows:
Article 1
The Parties hereby establish bilateral consultations at Senior Officials
level between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey and
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the State of Qatar (hereinafter referred to
as "the Consultations") to discuss bilateral relations between the two
countries as well as regional and international issues of common interest and
to exchange views and means of fostering and enhancing relations.
Article 2
The consultations may be held annually or more frequently as deemed
necessary, alternately in Ankara and in Doha. The agenda and duration of each
meeting will be determined through diplomatic channels.
Article 3
The outcome of the consultations shall not be made public, unless
otherwise agreed upon by the Parties.
Article 4
The Parties may set up working groups or expert meetings in order to
discuss specific areas of common interest. The results of these meetings shall
be reported to the Senior Officials Meetings.
Article 5
The Protocol shall enter into force on the date of the signing and shall
be valid for a period of 3 (three) years and shall automatically continue to
be in force and so forth, unless either Party notifies the other in writing of
its intention to terminate this Protocol 6 (six) months prior to its
expiration.
Either Party may request in writing the revision or amendment of this
Protocol. Any revision or amendment which has been agreed upon by the Parties
shall come into force on such date as will be determined by the Parties.
Done in duplicate in Doha on 3rd April 1999, in Turkish, Arabic, and
English languages, all texts being equally authentic. In case of any
divergence of interpretation, the English text shall prevail.
For the For the
MINISTRY OF MINISTRY OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS FOREIGN AFFAIRS
of the of the
REPUBLIC OF TURKEY STATE OF QATAR
Ugur Ergun Mohamad Nasr Hassan Al Nasr
Ambassador Director
Department of International Organizations,
Conferences and Treaties Affairs
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Appendix D: Agreement of Security Cooperation Between the Government 
of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of the State of Qatar, 2001 
  
18.02.2002 
Say: 24675 
18.02.2002 
Say: 24675 
18.02.2002 
Say: 24675 
18.02.2002 
Say: 24675 
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Appendix E: Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Turkey 
and the Government of the State of Qatar on Cooperation in Military Fields 
of Training, Technique and Science, 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
